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Abstract
We analyze the Condorcet paradox within a strategic bargaining model with ma-
jority voting, exogenous recognition probabilities, and no discounting. Stationary
subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) exist whenever the geometric mean of the play-
ers’ risk coefficients, ratios of utility differences between alternatives, is at most one.
SSPEs ensure agreement within finite expected time. For generic parameter values,
SSPEs are unique and exclude Condorcet cycles. In an SSPE, at least two players
propose their best alternative and at most one player proposes his middle alternative
with positive probability. Players never reject best alternatives, may reject mid-
dle alternatives with positive probability, and reject worst alternatives. Recognition
probabilities represent bargaining power and drive expected delay. Irrespective of
utilities, no delay occurs for suitable distributions of bargaining power, whereas ex-
pected delay goes to infinity in the limit where one player holds all bargaining power.
Contrary to the case with unanimous approval, a player benefits from an increase in
his risk aversion.
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1 Introduction
Decisions on collective choice problems are often taken by means of majority voting, and
the analysis of majority voting is therefore an important topic in political economy. When
preferences are such that some alternative beats every other feasible alternative in a pair-
wise vote, i.e. there is a Condorcet winner, then this will be the outcome reached for a
huge variety of games that capture the underlying institution. Such would be the case
for instance in models with real-time agenda setting and fixed defaults as in Banks and
Duggan (2000), in models with evolving defaults as studied in Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo
(2006), as well as in the more traditional social choice approach.
Unfortunately, Condorcet winners may not exist and this gives rise to the Condorcet
paradox in which any alternative can be reached from any other by a sequence of alterna-
tives, where each alternative in the sequence beats the previous one by a pairwise majority
vote as has been demonstrated in McKelvey (1976, 1979). It has been shown in the lit-
erature that the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox is not an artifact. Work by Plott
(1967), Rubinstein (1979), Schofield (1983), Cox (1984), and Le Breton (1987) shows that
this paradox occurs generically.
The lack of Condorcet winners is also a frequently observed empirical phenomenon.
Balinski and Laraki (2010) provide a detailed documentation of the occurrence of the
Condorcet paradox in the 1976 Cabernet-Sauvignon wine tasting in Paris, the 1994 general
election of the Danish Folketing, and the 2007 French presidential election. Roessler,
Shelegia, and Strulovici (2013) explain the underdevelopment of the Roman metro system
as a consequence of a Condorcet cycle in the majority preferences over building a metro,
preserving antiquities, and not digging.
In its most simple form the paradox features three players, three alternatives, and
players’ preferences such that a pairwise vote over the alternatives results in a Condorcet
cycle: one pair of players prefers the second alternative to the third alternative, another
pair of players prefers the first alternative to the second alternative, and a third pair of
players prefers the third alternative to the first alternative. Whether and how players reach
an agreement in this case is an open issue. It is the main research question addressed in
this paper.
We take the strategic bargaining approach to analyze the Condorcet paradox, an ap-
proach that is advocated in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Banks and Duggan (2000) to
study collective decision problems and that extends the seminal work on bargaining by
Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore (1987). Such an approach makes explicit how alternatives
that are up for voting are selected and how players vote on alternatives, both on and off
the equilibrium path.
In every bargaining round, exogenous and positive recognition probabilities select one
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player who has the right to propose. This recognized player either proposes one of the
three alternatives or gives up the right to propose in which case the bargaining proceeds to
the next round. In the former case, the other players publicly vote in a sequential order.
Majority voting among three players implies that one vote in favor suffices for acceptance,
after which the alternative will be implemented, and players receive their utility. Otherwise,
no alternative is implemented and we proceed to the next round where random selection
determines the next proposer. Perpetual disagreement leads to a utility of zero for all
players.
Our analysis complements the one of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), who use this bar-
gaining protocol to examine the collective decision problem of dividing a surplus, or the
more general framework of coalitional bargaining in Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta
(1993), which is the relevant case when the players can make arbitrary side-payments and
have utility functions that are linear in the side-payment received. We instead consider the
case where collective decision making concerns the choice out of a finite set of alternatives.
In many cases side-payments are impossible or prohibited, for instance when a government
agency decides on the location of a public facility, chooses what technology to use, and so
on, which would make our model the relevant one to consider.
Apart from offering insights in collective choice problems, our model also applies to
coalition and network formation, and thereby to marriage and roommate problems. Propos-
ing an alternative corresponds to proposing a coalition in a coalition formation context and
to proposing a link in a network formation model. Our model applies to coalition or network
formation without side-payments as well as to situations where the coalition or network is
formed first, and side-payments are made later. This is for instance the perspective taken
in Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in their work on network
formation.
Bloch (1996) studies a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the
coalitional surplus is fixed and payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure.
Bloch (1996) shows for the rejector-proposes protocol introduced in Selten (1981) that core
stable coalition structures can be attained as a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game, but that stationary subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies may fail to
exist when the condition of core stability is violated. When coalitional externalities are
absent, one obtains the class of hedonic games studied in Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011).
They note that, in roommate problems with odd top rings, equilibria in pure strategies do
not exist. When interpreted as a game of coalition formation, our model allows for three
non-trivial coalition structures to form, and the Condorcet cycle in our model is equivalent
to the absence of a core stable coalition structure and the presence of an odd top ring.
We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE). A subgame
2
perfect equilibrium is said to be stationary if the strategy of a player is the same whenever
the player faces the same continuation game. In identifying identical continuation games,
we follow the approach suggested in Maskin and Tirole (2001) for determining the notion
of a stationary strategy. For a foundation of stationary equilibria, we refer to Bhaskar,
Mailath, and Morris (2009).
For reasons similar to Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), we are interested in
the case where bargaining occurs relatively fast, so where players do not heavily discount
the future. To analyze this case, we derive equilibrium for the limit case where players
do not discount the future at all. Since our equilibria will be described as solutions to
a finite number of equations in the same number of unknowns, for generic values of our
parameters, one can apply the implicit function theorem to derive equilibria nearby the
limit equilibrium as a function of the discount factor.
When a player proposes his middle or worst alternative, it will be accepted for sure by
the player for whom this is the best alternative. Since proposing his middle alternative
strictly dominates proposing his worst alternative, a player will never propose his worst
alternative in an SSPE, and the SSPE utility of a player conditional on being the pro-
poser weakly exceeds the utility of his middle alternative. When a player proposes his best
alternative, it may or it may not be accepted by the player for whom this is the middle
alternative, and it will be rejected by the player for whom this is the worst alternative. A
proposing player thereby effectively faces a trade-off between getting the utility of his mid-
dle alternative for sure and proposing his best alternative, which may result in a rejection
and thereby ultimately in the continuation probability distribution on alternatives.
We show that the continuation utility of a player is at most equal to the utility of
his middle alternative, from which it follows that there is an advantage to propose. This
implies that, except for degenerate cases, a player is never willing to give up his right to
propose. Similarly, a player responding to a proposal consisting of his middle alternative
may accept it, thereby securing the utility of his middle alternative, or may reject it,
ultimately leading to the continuation probability distribution on all the alternatives.
Essentially a player has to make two decisions: by what probability do I propose my
middle alternative and by what probability do I reject my middle alternative when it is
offered to me. We define an equilibrium type by the number of players that propose
their best alternative for sure, as well as the number of players that accept their middle
alternative for sure. We show that across all parameter values seven equilibrium types are
possible, three of which occur for a degenerate set of parameter values only, leaving four
generic equilibrium types.
We find that in the vast majority of cases, a proposer proposes his best alternative.
In two of the generic equilibrium types, all players behave in this way with probability
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one, and in the other two generic equilibrium types two out of three players follow this
behavior, whereas the third player randomizes between proposing his best and proposing his
middle alternative. Rejections of proposals occur more frequently. In two of the generic
equilibrium types, two players out of three reject their middle alternative with positive
probability, and in only one type of equilibrium none of the players rejects his middle
alternative. Still it is the case that in all SSPEs, each proposal is accepted with positive
probability and perpetual disagreement does not occur.
Our main results give a novel perspective on the indeterminacy of the simplest Con-
dorcet paradox when it is embedded in an institutional setting where a recognized player
puts up an alternative for majority voting. We discuss our main results pointwise:
Existence. We derive a very simple condition that is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of an SSPE in mixed strategy profiles. To express this condition, we define a
player’s risk coefficient as the ratio of the utility difference between his best and middle
alternative to the utility difference between his middle and worst alternative. The risk
coefficient of a player is less than or equal to one if and only if the player prefers his
middle alternative to the fair lottery over his best and worst alternative. Risk coefficients
are equal to a particular transformation of the risk limit of Zeuthen (1930) and Harsanyi
(1977). The condition for existence states that the geometric mean of the players’ risk
coefficients should be less than or equal to one. As a side result, we also identify the
smaller subclass of preferences for which pure strategy SSPEs exist.
Agreement within finite time with probability 1. Every SSPE implies a stochastic equi-
librium outcome that can be seen as a lottery over all three alternatives, each with positive
probability. More importantly, the probability of perpetual disagreement is zero. Conse-
quently, each player’s expected equilibrium utility lies strictly between the utility associated
with his worst and best alternative. We also establish the stronger result that each player’s
expected equilibrium utility is at most the utility level of getting the middle alternative for
sure.
Generic uniqueness. For generic parameter values, there is a unique SSPE, though in
degenerate cases multiple SSPE utilities may exist.
Delay depends crucially on the division of bargaining power. In bargaining models a
suitable way to express bargaining power is by the choice of recognition probabilities, where
more bargaining power corresponds to a higher recognition probability. The division of
bargaining power is a key factor to explain expected bargaining delay. For each specification
of the agents’ utility functions it is possible to divide bargaining power in such a way that
no delay occurs at all. At the same time, when almost all the bargaining power goes to a
single agent, expected delay goes to infinity.
Stochastic cycles. Infinite cycles occur according to the logic of the Condorcet paradox
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by assumption. However, within a cooperative game theoretic setting, Chwe (1994) argues
that cycles cannot occur when players are farsighted. We study SSPE cycles in the sense
of whether there is a positive probability that an equilibrium path can result in which all
three alternatives have been proposed and rejected before some alternative is accepted.
Generically, such SSPE cycles do not occur, though SSPE cycles are possible in degenerate
cases.
Risk aversion improves the bargaining position. The general conclusion of the bargain-
ing literature with unanimous approval and side–payments is that risk-aversion undermines
a player’s bargaining position, see e.g. Roth (1985), Safra, Zhou, and Zilcha (1990), and
Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler (1991). Harrington (1990) shows that without unani-
mous approval this result no longer holds, and when the preferences of players are not too
diverse a higher degree of risk-aversion is beneficial. We investigate changes in risk aversion
in our discrete choice model featuring the Condorcet paradox and obtain an unambiguous
result where we use the criterion of first-order stochastic dominance. A less risk-averse
player does worse in the sense that the probability of attaining his best alternative weakly
decreases, and the probability of attaining his worst alternative weakly increases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bargaining model and Sec-
tion 3 presents four characteristic examples. Section 4 introduces the notion of SSPE and
characterizes the set of SSPEs as the solutions to a specific system of equations. In that
section, we also derive some of the general properties and reduce the complexity of the
problem at hand. Then, Section 5 analyzes this system by summarizing the various equi-
librium types discussed before. The details of the calculations are relegated to Appendix A.
All the other proofs can be found in Appendix B. Section 6 combines all the results of Sec-
tion 5 and studies the questions of SSPE existence and uniqueness. Section 7 analyzes the
potential for delay and cycles and Section 8 the role of risk aversion. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
Three players, labeled i = 1, 2, 3, have to decide which out of three possible outcomes, x1,
x2, and x3, should be implemented. The preferences of the players satisfy the following
restriction
x1 1,3 x2 1,2 x3 2,3 x1. (2.1)
The formulation in (2.1) means that players 1 and 3 prefer the outcome x1 to x2, players
1 and 2 prefer the outcome x2 to x3, and players 2 and 3 prefer the outcome x3 to x1, so
the players are involved in a decision problem that gives rise to the Condorcet paradox. A
naive approach would lead to the claim that majority voting over the alternatives results
in a cycle.
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Here we model majority voting over the alternatives by means of an explicit extensive-
form game. We take the standard non-cooperative bargaining model from the literature,
based on the work by Rubinstein (1982) and in particular Binmore (1987). The same
bargaining protocol has been advocated in Banks and Duggan (2000) to analyze collective
choice problems, and has been used in their work on bargaining in legislatures by Baron
and Ferejohn (1989).
We assume that in each period t some player, say player i, is selected randomly according
to an a priori specified probability distribution. Player i then decides either to make a
proposal to the other two players, i.e. he proposes some outcome xj, or he decides not to
make a proposal, and the players reach period t+ 1. In the latter case, we say that player
i makes proposal x0. In the former case, the other two players vote sequentially.
1 To avoid
inessential multiplicity of equilibria, we assume that the player who ranks the outcome
highest, is the first one to vote.2
Table 1 illustrates the order in which players vote given a proposal by some player,
where in the table (xj, i) means that proposal xj is made by player i. If player 1 proposes
x1, then we assume that first player 3 votes and next, conditional on a vote against by
player 3, player 2. After player i makes proposal xj, the first player to respond is denoted
by fji, the second by sji.
Proposal Sequence Proposal Sequence Proposal Sequence
(x1, 1) (3,2) (x1, 2) (1,3) (x1, 3) (1,2)
(x2, 1) (2,3) (x2, 2) (1,3) (x2, 3) (2,1)
(x3, 1) (3,2) (x3, 2) (3,1) (x3, 3) (2,1)
Table 1: The order of voting.
A voter casts a vote either in favor or against xj. If the first voter casts a vote in favor
of xj, then together with the proposer he forms a majority in favor of xj, the outcome xj
is accepted, and bargaining ends. If the first voter votes against xj, then the second voter
is allowed to vote. If the second voter casts a vote in favor of xj, then again a majority is
in favor of xj, the outcome xj is accepted, and bargaining ends. Otherwise, period t+ 1 is
1Simultaneous voting may lead to undesirable equilibria due to coordination failures. For instance, the
case where all players vote in favor of all proposals leads to an equilibrium, as there is no player who can
gain by deviating. To avoid this problem, it is standard to assume either sequential voting or simultaneous
voting with players use stage–undominated voting strategies.
2Suppose player 1 proposes x2, the best outcome for player 2, and suppose that player 3 votes before
player 2. The outcome x2 is the worst outcome for player 3. Player 3 may nevertheless decide to vote in
favor of x2 since he knows that the proposal will be accepted anyhow by player 2 next and is therefore
indifferent as far as his own voting behavior is concerned.
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reached. In period t+ 1 a new proposer is selected, and the entire procedure is repeated.
We assume that the probability of being recognized as a proposer is given by ρ =
(ρ1, ρ2, ρ3) in each period t, where ρ1 +ρ2 +ρ3 = 1 and ρi > 0 is the probability that player
i is recognized.
The preferences of the players are represented by von-Neumann Morgenstern utility
functions. We normalize utilities in such a way that the utility of disagreement forever is
0 for all players.
We are interested in the case where bargaining occurs relatively fast, so players do not
heavily discount the future. To analyze this case, we derive equilibrium for the limit case
where players do not discount the future at all. For generic values of our parameters, one
can apply the implicit function theorem to derive equilibria nearby the limit equilibrium as
a function of the discount factor. Player i’s utility of acceptance of proposal xj in period
t is equal to ui(xj). To satisfy (2.1), we have that
u1(x1) > u
1(x2) > u
1(x3) ≥ 0, (2.2)
u2(x2) > u
2(x3) > u
2(x1) ≥ 0, (2.3)
u3(x3) > u
3(x1) > u
3(x2) ≥ 0. (2.4)
For i = 1, 2, 3, and j = 0, 1, 2, 3, we define uij = u
i(xj), uj = (u
1
j , u
2
j , u
3
j), u
i = (ui0, u
i
1, u
i
2, u
i
3)
>,
and u = (u1, u2, u3). For i = 1, 2, 3, we define bi,mi, and wi as the number of the alternative
related to the best, middle, and worst outcome for player i. For instance, we have b1 = 1,
m2 = 3, and w3 = 2.
Each sequence of proposers, proposals, and votes defines a history. A pure behavioral
strategy of a player assigns an action to each history where he has to take a decision, and
mixed behavioral strategies are defined in the usual way. Every strategy implies a prob-
ability distribution (pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3) over the four possible final outcomes, being perpetual
disagreement, agreement on x1, agreement on x2, and agreement on x3. Any mixed strat-
egy therefore implies expected payoffs that are a weighted average of uj, j = 0, 1, 2, 3, with
weights pij. Note that pi0 > 0 implies a positive probability of the players’ worst possible
outcome of perpetual disagreement.
Utility functions u and recognition probabilities ρ satisfying (2.2)–(2.4) determine a
game G = (u, ρ) in extensive form. The class of all such games is denoted G.
3 Four Characteristic Examples
In this section we present four examples that give rise to the four equilibrium types that
occur across generic parameter values. We will show in Section 5 that up to degeneracies,
the four examples represent all the possible cases.
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Assume players use strategies that are time and history independent. We use pibi ,
pimi , and p
i
wi
to denote the probability that player i proposes his best, middle, and worst
alternative, respectively. In this section we ignore the possibility that player i proposes x0,
i.e. gives up the right to propose, so pibi + p
i
mi
+ piwi = 1. Similarly, we use a
i
bi
, aimi , and
aiwi to denote the probability that player i accepts his best, middle, and worst alternative,
respectively, when offered to him, so 0 ≤ abi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ami ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ awi ≤ 1.
For all the examples in this section, we assume that recognition probabilities are uni-
form, i.e. every player is recognized with probability 1/3 to be the proposer. Table 2
presents Example 3.1, a typical case where the Condorcet paradox applies.
u1 u2 u3 p1 p2 p3 a1 a2 a3
x1 3 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1
x2 2 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
x3 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 1 1
Table 2: Parameter values and equilibrium strategies in Example 3.1.
In Example 3.1, if a player i proposes his middle alternative, he is sure it will be
accepted by the player for whom this is the best alternative. It follows that conditional on
being the proposer, his payoff is at least uimi . It is then clear that no player would like to
propose his worst alternative, since it would be accepted by the player for whom this is the
best alternative, leading to a payoff uiwi . On the other hand, it is not a priori clear what
happens if a player proposes his best alternative. For sure it will be rejected by the player
for whom this is the worst alternative. However, the player for whom this is the middle
alternative may or may not accept it.
Consider for Example 3.1 the pure strategy combination illustrated in Table 2 where
every player proposes his best alternative for sure and always accepts his middle and best
alternative when offered to him. At this strategy combination there is immediate agreement
and all outcomes occur with probability 1/3.
We claim, and prove formally later on in Theorem A.4.4, that such a strategy com-
bination is an equilibrium. The intuition following from the consideration of one-stage
deviations is as follows. When a player is selected as a proposer, he obtains a utility of 3
and clearly has no incentive to deviate. When a player has to vote on his middle alternative
he gets a utility of 2 when he follows the equilibrium strategy. A one-shot deviation to
a rejection leads to a uniform probability distribution on each outcome, giving rise to an
expected utility of 5/3, and is therefore not attractive.
Table 3 presents Example 3.2. The only modification in this example when compared
to Example 3.1 is that the utility of the middle alternative of player 2 has dropped from
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u1 u2 u3 p1 p2 p3 a1 a2 a3
x1 3 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1
x2 2 3 0 0 1 0 1/2 1 0
x3 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 1/2 1
Table 3: Parameter values and equilibrium strategies in Example 3.2.
2 to 1. The pure strategy combination of Example 3.1 is no longer an equilibrium. The
reason is that player 2 no longer has an incentive to accept when the middle alternative
is offered to him. Indeed, accepting leads to a utility of 1, whereas a one-shot deviation
to rejection gives rise to the uniform probability distribution on all alternatives, and an
expected utility of 4/3. The problem, in a sense, is that the continuation utility is too
favorable for player 2. In order to make him accept his middle alternative, he should be
disciplined by rejections of his proposal x2 by player 1. Indeed, if player 1 rejects an offer
of x2 with probability 1/2, the ex ante probabilities pi1 and pi2 of outcomes x1 and x2 are
proportional to (2/3, 1/3), so the continuation utility of player 2 following a rejection is 1,
as desired to make player 2 indifferent between accepting and rejecting x3.
If player 2 would accept x3 for sure, then player 1 has no incentives to reject x2 with
probability 1/2. Indeed, following a rejection the expected continuation utility of player 1
is below 2 since the outcomes x1 and x3 are occurring with equal probability. To improve
upon the continuation utility of player 1, player 2 should reject x3 with probability 1/2
when offered to him, making outcomes x1 and x3 occur with probability proportional to
(2/3, 1/3), making player 1 indifferent between accepting and rejecting x2. The equilibrium
strategy combination is given in Table 3. It is formally proved to be an equilibrium in
Theorem A.4.2. In this case there is agreement with probability 2/3 per bargaining round
and the players reach an agreement within finite time with probability 1. It is impossible
that cycles across players occur because the proposal x3 by player 3 is accepted for sure
by player 1.
We turn next to Example 3.3, which is illustrated in Table 4. It has a similar structure
as Example 3.2, except that the ratio of the utility differences between best and middle,
and middle and worst, have gone down for players 1 and 3 from 1/3 to 1/4, and for
player 2 from 2 to 5/4. These ratios will be formally defined in Section 4 and are called
risk coefficients. Risk coefficients are a crucial tool to understand the strategic situation
of the players involved in the bargaining process. One of our main results is for instance
that equilibria exist if and only if the product of the risk coefficients, or equivalently,
their geometric mean, is less than or equal to 1, a property that is readily verified for the
examples of this section.
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u1 u2 u3 p1 p2 p3 a1 a2 a3
x1 5 0 4 1 0 1/4 1 0 1
x2 4 9 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
x3 0 4 5 0 0 3/4 0 4/7 1
Table 4: Parameter values and equilibrium strategies in Example 3.3.
Suppose we had the same equilibrium type as in Example 3.2. As before Player 2
has to be disciplined in order to accept x3. If player 1 rejects x2 with probability 1/5,
we have pi1 : pi2 = 5/9 : 4/9, which leads to an expected continuation utility of 4 for
player 2 following a rejection, which makes him indifferent between accepting and rejecting
x2, as desired. To make player 1 willing to reject x2, his continuation utility following a
rejection should be brought up to 4, which can be achieved by having player 2 reject x3 with
probability 3/4. The resulting strategy profile results in (pi1, pi2, pi3) = (20/41, 16/41, 5/41).
However, now player 3 is no longer willing to propose x3. Proposing x3 leads to acceptance
and utility 5 with probability 1/4, but to rejection and utility 105/41 with probability 3/4.
The expected utility is then below 4, which player 3 could obtain by proposing x1.
The alternative to make player 2 accept x3 is to have player 3 randomize between
proposing x1 and x3. Indeed, if player 3 proposes x1 with probability 1/4 and x3 with
probability 3/4, we have pi1 : pi2 = 5/9 : 4/9, which makes player 2 indifferent between
accepting and rejecting x3. To make player 3 willing to randomize between proposing x1
and proposing x3, his proposal x3 should be rejected by player 2 with probability 3/7. We
then have (pi1, pi2, pi3) = (35/75, 28/75, 12/75), and player 3 is indeed indifferent between
proposing x1 and getting utility 4 for sure, or proposing x3, getting an acceptance and a
utility of 5 with probability 4/7, and getting a rejection and an expected utility of 8/3 with
probability 3/7. We have derived the strategy profile presented in Table 4. It is proved to
be an equilibrium in Theorem A.3.2. We can make similar observations as in Example 3.2.
An agreement is reached in finite time with probability 1 and Condorcet cycles do not
occur.
We finally turn to Example 3.4. It is identical to Example 3.3, except that the risk
coefficient of player 2 has gone up from 5/4 to 2. Suppose we had the same equilibrium
type as in Example 3.3, so we have player 3 mix between proposing x1 and x3.
To make player 2 indifferent between accepting and rejecting x3, player 3 should propose
x1 with probability 1. However, since now pi3 = 0, player 1 will only accept the proposal x2
by player 2 if pi1 = 0, which is not possible, since player 3 proposes x1 with probability 1.
To make player 2 indifferent between accepting and rejecting x3, we need a combination
of player 3 randomizing between proposing x1 and x3, and by having player 1 rejecting
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u1 u2 u3 p1 p2 p3 a1 a2 a3
x1 5 0 4 1 0 1/3 1 0 1
x2 4 3 0 0 1 0 2/3 1 0
x3 0 1 5 0 0 2/3 0 1/2 1
Table 5: Parameter values and equilibrium strategies in Example 3.4.
x2 with positive probability. Moreover, to make player 3 willing to propose x1, we need
player 2 to reject x3 with positive probability. Solving the resulting system of equations,
leads to the equilibrium strategy in Table 5. This strategy profile is proved to be an
equilibrium in Theorem A.3.1. Also in this example, the Condorcet paradox is resolved.
We will show in Section 5 that up to degeneracies, the four examples represent all the
possible cases, even when recognition probabilities are not required to be uniform. Except
for degenerate cases, it holds that the equilibrium either has the structure of Example 3.1
with all players proposing their best alternative and accepting their middle alternative for
sure, or the structure of Example 3.2 with all players proposing their best alternative,
one player accepting his middle alternative for sure and two players randomizing between
acceptance and rejection of their middle alternative, or the structure of Example 3.3 with
one player randomizing between proposing his best and middle alternative, and a positive
chance of a rejection when he chooses to propose his best alternative, or the structure of
Example 3.4 with one player randomizing between proposing his best and middle alterna-
tive, and the other two players randomizing between accepting and rejecting their middle
alternative.
We see that players propose their best alternative in the vast majority of cases, either
since we are in a situation like Example 3.1 or 3.2 where all players propose their best
alternative for sure, or since we are in a situation like Example 3.3 or 3.4 where two out of
three players propose their best alternative for sure and the third player proposes his best
alternative with positive probability. It is also clear that a player who proposes his middle
alternative with positive probability, expects rejections with positive probability when he
proposes his best alternative. Such a player will never reject when his middle alternative is
proposed to him. Also, as Example 3.2 demonstrates, even if everybody proposes his best
alternative, rejections can occur, but there is at most one player who considers to do so.
Finally, when a player proposes his best alternative, it is never rejected for sure, but there
is always a positive probability that it be accepted.
We will show in Section 6 that for generic parameter values equilibria are unique. The
equilibrium strategies exhibited in the examples are the only equilibrium strategies.
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4 Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We analyze the extensive-form game of Section 2 by examining its stationary subgame
perfect equilibria. Suppose a player has to take an action at two subgames that are iso-
morphic. Then stationarity requires that the player take the same probability mix over
actions in both subgames. In defining two subgames to be isomorphic, we follow the ap-
proach of Maskin and Tirole (2001), which corresponds to the coarsest way of doing so. A
subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies is called a stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium (SSPE).
Since the continuation game following the selection of a proposer is history independent,
we can restrict ourselves to strategies where the proposal is history independent. We denote
by pij the probability that player i proposes xj when he is recognized as proposer. Since the
continuation game following a proposal by some player depends only on the proposal made
and the identity of the proposer, the rejection probability may only depend on the identity
of the proposer and the proposal made, but not on any other aspect of the history. The
continuation game starting with the last responder to a proposal depends on the proposal
made, but does not depend on the identity of the proposer. We therefore require the
response of the last responder to be independent of the identity of the proposer.
The probability that player i rejects a proposal xj by player h is denoted r
i
jh. As
explained in the previous paragraph, the notion of a stationary strategy imposes the re-
quirement r132 = r
1
33, r
2
11 = r
2
13, and r
3
21 = r
3
22. For notational simplicity, we define r
i
0h = 1.
We define the set P of admissible proposals by P = P 1 × P 2 × P 3, where
P i = {pi ∈ R4+ |
∑
j=0,1,2,3
pij = 1}, i = 1, 2, 3,
and the set R of admissible rejection probabilities by R = R1 ×R2 ×R3, where
Ri = {ri ∈ [0, 1]4×2 | for h, h′ 6= i, ri0h = 1 and riwih = riwih′}.
Given stationary strategies, we can compute the expected utilities of the players. It will be
useful to do so conditional on the identity of the proposer. The expected utility of player i
conditional on the proposer being player h is denoted by vih. Unconditional expected utility
of player i is zi and satisfies zi =
∑3
h=1 ρhv
i
h.
Stationarity of the strategies implies that the following recursive system holds,
vih =
3∑
j=0
phj (1− rh−1jh rh+1jh )uij +
3∑
j=0
phj r
h−1
jh r
h+1
jh z
i, i = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, (4.1)
zi =
3∑
h=1
ρhv
i
h, i = 1, 2, 3. (4.2)
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In the definition of rejection probabilities above, we identify player 0 with player 3, and
player 4 with player 1. Equation (4.1) expresses that the expected utility of player i
conditional on the proposer being player h is equal to the sum over all proposals of the
probability that player h makes this proposal and that it is accepted by the other players
times the utility of the proposal plus the probability that player h makes a proposal that
is rejected times the continuation utility zi.
For the remainder of this section, let (p, r) be an SSPE inducing continuation utilities
v and z. No player has a profitable deviation at any decision node, so in particular, no
player has a profitable one-shot deviation at any decision node. The absence of a profitable
one-shot deviation is equivalent to the following set of implications, where in (4.3) it holds
that i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
pij > 0 ⇒ (1− ri−1ji ri+1ji )uij + ri−1ji ri+1ji zi = max
k∈{0,1,2,3}
(1− ri−1ki ri+1ki )uik + ri−1ki ri+1ki zi, (4.3)
rijh > 0 ⇒ zi ≥ uij or ri
′
jh = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = fjh, i
′ = sjh, (4.4)
rijh < 1 ⇒ zi ≤ uij or ri
′
jh = 0, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = fjh, i
′ = sjh, (4.5)
rijh > 0 ⇒ zi ≥ uij, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = sjh, (4.6)
rijh < 1 ⇒ zi ≤ uij, j = 1, 2, 3, h = 1, 2, 3, i = sjh. (4.7)
Equality (4.3) expresses that a proposal that is made with positive probability maximizes
the sum of instantaneous and continuation utility. We obtain (4.4) by observing that
rijh > 0 implies (1 − ri′jh)uij + ri′jhzi ≥ uij; the utility to player i of rejecting proposal j by
player h should weakly exceed the utility of acceptance. This inequality is equivalent to
zi ≥ uij or ri′jh = 0. The derivation of (4.5)–(4.7) is analogous. Observe that (4.4)–(4.5)
correspond to the cases where player i is the first voter to accept or reject a proposal, and
(4.6)–(4.7) to the cases where player i is the second voter to make such a decision.
We now derive several properties of SSPEs, thereby reducing (4.3)–(4.7) to a consider-
ably simpler system. The first property states that forever delay with probability 1 is not
an SSPE. Indeed, forever delay with probability 1 implies, for every i, zi = 0 and vi = 0.
By (4.3), player 1 should obtain expected utility 0 from proposing x1, which can only be
the case if r211 = r
3
11 = 1. By (4.4), r
3
11 = 1 implies z
3 ≥ u31 or r211 = 0. This leads to a
contradiction as z3 = 0 < u31 and r
2
11 = 1. It follows that forever delay with probability 1
is not an SSPE.
We have derived that some player makes with positive probability a proposal that is
accepted with positive probability. Since such a player is recognized with positive probabil-
ity, the probability that negotiations have not terminated at period t goes to zero as t goes
to infinity. In other words, at any SSPE there is an agreement in finite time with probabil-
ity 1. In SSPE, even perfectly patient players do not cycle forever with positive probability.
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Theorem 4.1 It holds that pi0 = 0, every SSPE leads to agreement in finite time with
probability 1.
Since pi0 = 0, each z
i is therefore a weighted average of uij, j = 1, 2, 3, with pij ∈ [0, 1]
such that pi1 + pi2 + pi3 = 1 independent of i. It holds in particular that pij > 0 for some
j = 1, 2, 3 and (z1, z2, z3) 6= 0.
This result shows that bargaining under exogenous recognition probabilities is a road
map to overcome the Condorcet paradox. Given the indeterminacy of many cooperative
theories about the Condorcet paradox, this result already suggests a great potential in
further elaborating the bargaining approach.
Conditions (4.1)–(4.7) are necessary conditions for an SSPE. For games with discount-
ing, these necessary conditions are also sufficient. Since we abstain from discounting, we
need the slightly stronger necessary and sufficient conditions as presented in Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2 The strategy profile (p, r) ∈ P × R is an SSPE if and only if there is h
such that
∑3
j=0 p
h
j r
h−1
jh r
h+1
jh < 1 and there is v ∈ R3×3 and z ∈ R3 such that (4.1)–(4.7) hold.
In the next step, we use the characterization of SSPE given in Theorem 4.2 to derive a
number of intuitive properties that equilibria should satisfy.
Theorem 4.3 Let the strategy profile (p, r) be an SSPE with continuation utilities z
and outcome probability distribution pi. Then
piwi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, (4.8)
riwih = 1, i = 1, 2, 3, h 6= i, (4.9)
r221 = r
3
32 = r
1
13 = 0, (4.10)
r231r
3
31 = r
1
12r
3
12 = r
1
23r
2
23 = 0, (4.11)
zi > uiwi , i = 1, 2, 3, (4.12)
zi < uibi , i = 1, 2, 3, (4.13)
pi1, pi2, pi3 > 0. (4.14)
According to (4.12), each player i has zi strictly exceeding the utility uiwi of his worst
outcome and, according to (4.13), has zi strictly lower than the utility of his best outcome,
uibi . It then follows that any voter rejects his worst alternative for sure as expressed in (4.9).
It follows from (4.10) that the middle alternative is accepted by the player for whom this
is the best alternative, whereas (4.11) claims that proposing the worst alternative leads
to an acceptance. The recognized player can therefore always conclude the bargaining for
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sure by proposing his worst or his middle alternative. As a corollary, a recognized player
will never propose his worst alternative, because he can do strictly better by proposing his
middle alternative, and (4.8) follows. Finally, (4.14) states that, ex ante, every alternative
is accepted with strictly positive probability.
The next result claims that there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to
proposer-independent rejection probabilities.
Theorem 4.4 If (p, r) ∈ P × R is an SSPE inducing utilities v and z, then there is
also an SSPE (p, r¯) ∈ P ×R inducing utilities v and z such that r¯ is proposer-independent,
i.e. r¯ijh = r¯
i
jh′ for all i, j, h, and h
′. Moreover, r¯ can be defined by setting, for i = 1, 2, 3,
r¯ibii+1 = 0, r¯
i
mii−1 = r
i
mii+1
, and r¯ijh = r
i
jh, otherwise.
By virtue of Theorem 4.4, we may drop the subscript indicating the proposer from the
notation of a rejection probability. It is also more convenient now to express all equations in
terms of acceptance probabilities rather than rejection probabilities. The set of proposer-
independent acceptance probabilities is A = A1 × A2 × A3, where
Ai = {ai ∈ [0, 1]4 | ai0 = 0}.
It follows from Theorem 4.3 that at an SSPE (p, a¯) ∈ P ×A, for every player i, piwi = 0,
a¯iwi = 0, and a¯
i
bi
= 1. The only variables that have not yet been determined are pi0, p
i
mi
, pibi ,
and a¯imi . It seems intuitive that the recognized player is better off making some proposal
instead of not making a proposal, so pi0 should be equal to 0. As we will show in Section A.1,
for some parameter values we can have pi0 > 0 for some i. In such cases, however, there
also exists an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯i0 = 0 for all players i that yields exactly the
same utilities. This implies that in characterizing the set of SSPEs, we may first search
for SSPEs (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯i0 = 0 for all players i. Indeed, if (p, a¯) is an SSPE with
pi0 6= 0 for some i, then (p¯, a¯) is also an SSPE, where p¯ibi = pibi + pi0, p¯i0 = 0, and p¯ij = pij for
j 6= 0, bi. By the definition of SSPE it should not be profitable to propose xbi instead of x0.
This means that either xbi is rejected with probability 1 when proposed or z
i = uibi . The
latter case contradicts (4.13), so we only have to consider the former case. Since we are
considering SSPEs, the change in strategy from not making a proposal to proposing one’s
best outcome, which is rejected with probability 1, is not affecting the payoffs of anyone,
and is also an SSPE.
The next proposition gives an easy characterization of SSPEs (p¯, a¯) ∈ P ×A where no
player gives up the right to make a proposal, i.e. p¯i0 = 0 for all players i.
Theorem 4.5 The strategy profile (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A is an SSPE where all players make
a proposal with probability one if and only if for i = 1, 2, 3, p¯i0 = p¯
i
wi
= 0, a¯ibi = 1, a¯
i
wi
= 0,
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and there is p¯i ∈ R3++ and z¯ ∈ R3 such that
p¯imi > 0⇒ uimi ≥ a¯i−1mi−1uibi + (1− a¯i−1mi−1)z¯i, i = 1, 2, 3, (4.15)
p¯ibi > 0⇒ a¯i−1mi−1uibi + (1− a¯i−1mi−1)z¯i ≥ uimi , i = 1, 2, 3, (4.16)
a¯imi < 1⇒ z¯i ≥ uimi , i = 1, 2, 3, (4.17)
a¯imi > 0⇒ z¯i ≤ uimi , i = 1, 2, 3, (4.18)
p¯i1u
i
1 + p¯i2u
i
2 + p¯i3u
i
3 = z¯
i, i = 1, 2, 3, (4.19)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, (4.20)
p¯i1 : p¯i2 = ρ1p¯
1
b1
a¯31 + ρ3p¯
3
m3
: ρ2p¯
2
b2
a¯12 + ρ1p¯
1
m1
, (4.21)
p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ2p¯
2
b2
a¯12 + ρ1p¯
1
m1
: ρ3p¯
3
b3
a¯23 + ρ2p¯
2
m2
. (4.22)
5 Equilibrium Types
The results of the previous section show that player i faces two dilemmas. First, by what
probability pimi will I propose my middle alternative xmi knowing it will be accepted for
sure instead of taking the risk involved in proposing my best alternative. Second, by what
probability aimi will I accept my middle alternative xmi when offered to me knowing that
rejecting it leads to a gamble over my top three alternatives including my worst. These
dilemmas concern the SSPE values of pimi and a
i
mi
that also pin down pibi = 1− pimi .
The answer to the first dilemma results in four possible types of equilibrium. The first
one is where all players i have a positive p¯imi . This case is analyzed in Appendix A.1. The
other types of equilibria are characterized by two, one, and none of the players having a
positive p¯imi and are treated in Appendix A.2, A.3, and A.4, respectively. The answer to the
second dilemma is intimately related to the value of the equilibrium continuation utility z¯i.
We will show that all SSPEs have the property that z¯i ≤ uimi . Then it follows that a¯imi = 1
if z¯i < uimi , whereas values for a¯
i
mi
strictly below 1 are admitted when z¯i = uimi .
Theorem A.1 collects the conditions under which an SSPE with three players having a
positive p¯imi exists. These conditions hold in degenerate cases only. Moreover, in any such
SSPE it holds that z¯i = uimi for all players i. We show that SSPEs with two players having
a positive p¯imi do not exist. For the case with one of the players having a positive p¯
i
mi
there exist two equilibrium subtypes, depending on the number of players with z¯i = uimi .
These subtypes are treated in the subsections A.3.1, when there is one such player, and
A.3.2, when there are two such players. Theorem A.3.1 and A.3.2 provide conditions under
which such SSPEs exist. For the case with none of the players having a positive p¯imi there
exist four equilibrium subtypes, again depending on the number of players with z¯i = uimi .
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Theorem Example Proposals Utilities Occurrence
A.1 p¯12 > 0 p¯
2
3 > 0 p¯
3
1 > 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31 Degenerate
A.3.1 3.4 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 > 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 > 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
p¯12 > 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
A.3.2 3.3 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 > 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 > 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 > 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
A.4.1 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31 Degenerate
A.4.2 3.2 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
A.4.3 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31 Degenerate
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31 Degenerate
p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31 Degenerate
A.4.4 3.1 p¯12 = 0 p¯
2
3 = 0 p¯
3
1 = 0 z¯
1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31
Table 6: Characteristics of the various types of equilibrium.
These subtypes are treated in the Subsections A.4.1, A.4.2, A.4.3, and A.4.4 of Appendix
A.4, where Subsection A.4.k treats the case when there are k − 1 players with z¯i = uimi .
Theorem A.4.1, A.4.2, A.4.3, and A.4.4 collect the conditions under which such SSPEs
exist.
Table 6 summarizes the characteristics of the SSPEs as found in the Appendix. The
equilibrium types and subtypes lead to a total of seven cases, with three cases being
degenerate. The cases A.3.1, A.3.2, A.4.1, and A.4.2 have three rows, corresponding to
permutations of the players’ roles. Four cases, A.3.1, A.3.2, A.4.2, and A.4.4, are robust
in the sense of having positive Lebesgue measure in the parameter space. Case A.4.4
corresponds to an SSPE in pure strategies.
Table 7 shows the conditions for which particular types of equilibria exist. To explain
these conditions, it is instructive to define the risk coefficient αi of player i by
αi =
uibi − uimi
uimi − uiwi
, i = 1, 2, 3.
Moreover, for notational convenience, we define
β1 =
1− α1α2α3
α1 + α1α3 + α1α2α3
, β2 =
1− α1α2α3
α2 + α1α2 + α1α2α3
, and β3 =
1− α1α2α3
α3 + α2α3 + α1α2α3
.
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Theorem Example Conditions on α Conditions on ρ Occurrence
A.1 α1α2α3 = 1 Degenerate
A.3.1 3.4 α1α2α3 < 1
ρ1
ρ3
< β1 ρ2 ≥ α3β3
ρ3
ρ2
< β3 ρ1 ≥ α2β2
ρ2
ρ1
< β2 ρ3 ≥ α1β1
A.3.2 3.3 α1α2α3 < 1
ρ1
ρ2
< α2 ρ2 < α3β3
ρ3
ρ1
< α1 ρ1 < α2β2
ρ2
ρ3
< α3 ρ3 < α1β1
A.4.1 α1α2α3 = 1 Degenerate
A.4.2 3.2 α1α2α3 < 1
ρ1
ρ3
≥ β1 ρ1ρ2 ≤ α2
ρ3
ρ1
≥ α1
ρ3
ρ2
≥ β3 ρ3ρ1 ≤ α1
ρ2
ρ3
≥ α3
ρ2
ρ1
≥ β2 ρ2ρ3 ≤ α3
ρ1
ρ2
≥ α2
A.4.3 α1α2α3 < 1
ρ3
ρ1
= α1 ρ1 <
1
1+α1+α1α3
Degenerate
ρ1
ρ2
= α2 ρ2 <
1
1+α2+α1α2
Degenerate
ρ2
ρ3
= α3 ρ3 <
1
1+α3+α2α3
Degenerate
A.4.4 3.1 α1α2α3 < 1
ρ1
ρ2
> α2
ρ2
ρ3
> α3
ρ3
ρ1
> α1
Table 7: Conditions under which various types of equilibria exist.
Table 7 demonstrates that the conditions for SSPE existence can be formulated in terms
of the players’ risk coefficients (since also βi can be expressed in terms of α1, α2, and α3)
and the recognition probability vector ρ only.
The risk coefficient is closely related to the concept of risk limit as introduced in Zeuthen
(1930) and further developed in Harsanyi (1977). The risk limit is defined in a setting with
two players and three outcomes. There is the outcome proposed by the player himself, say
y1, the outcome proposed by his opponent, say y2, and the disagreement outcome, say y0.
The risk limit of a player is then defined as the probability on the disagreement outcome
for which he would be indifferent between getting the disagreement outcome with that
probability and y1 with the remaining probability, and getting outcome y2 for sure. In a
formula the risk limit ` is given by
` =
u(y1)− u(y2)
u(y1)− u(y0) .
This paper involves three players and four alternatives (we now count the disagreement
outcome as one alternative), so the risk limit is not directly applicable. However, if we
define y1 as the best alternative xbi for player i, y2 as his middle alternative xmi , and y0 as
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his worst alternative xwi , then a straightforward calculation reveals that
`i =
αi
1 + αi
.
Alternatively, we can write αi = `i/(1− `i).
A player i who is indifferent between getting xmi for sure and a fair lottery on xbi and
xwi has a risk coefficient of 1. A player with a risk coefficient above 1 prefers the lottery,
a player with a risk coefficient below 1 prefers getting his middle outcome for sure. It is
immediate from Table 7 that the a necessary condition for SSPE existence is α1α2α3 ≤ 1,
or equivalently, 3
√
α1α2α3 ≤ 1. In words this condition expresses that the geometric mean
of the players’ risk coefficients is less than or equal to 1. In the next section this condition
is also shown to be sufficient for SSPE existence.
The robust cases have the following defining characteristics: First, conditional on being
recognized, at most one player randomizes between his best and middle alternative, and the
other players always propose their best alternative for sure. To put it differently, at most
one player proposes cautiously and the others aggressively. Second, the number of players
who propose their best alternative and get it accepted for sure can be any number ranging
from one to three, but it cannot be zero. Third, at the start of any bargaining round
during ongoing negotiations, all players can realize, in expectation, an SSPE utility that is
at most the utility of the middle alternative, so z¯i ≤ uimi . In case the inequality is strict,
player i accepts his middle alternative for sure, whenever it is on the table. In any SSPE,
this will provoke player i+ 1, for whom mi is the best alternative, to propose aggressively
whenever he is recognized. Fourth, conditional on being recognized, a player realizes a
utility weakly exceeding the utility of his middle alternative, so v¯ii ≥ uimi . Moreover, it can
be shown that there is a strict advantage in being recognized, so v¯ii > z¯
i.
6 Existence and Uniqueness of SSPEs
Table 7 shows that SSPEs can only exist if the geometric mean of the risk coefficients is
less than or equal to 1. The next result states that this condition is not only necessary,
but also sufficient for the existence of SSPEs.
Theorem 6.1 There exists an SSPE if and only if α1α2α3 ≤ 1.
The necessary and sufficient condition for SSPE existence requires risk coefficients to
be sufficiently low on average. It allows for one or two risk coefficients that are larger
than one, but then at least one player’s risk coefficient should be sufficiently below one.
A player with a low risk coefficient prefers his middle outcome over a lottery involving his
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worst and best outcome, and is therefore more inclined to accept proposals offering his
middle outcome. The uncertainty over outcomes resulting from the rejection of a proposal
helps to avoid the Condorcet paradox and leads to equilibrium existence.
What can be said when α1α2α3 > 1? An SSPE does not exist by Theorem 6.1. Nev-
ertheless, it is conceivable that weaker versions of equilibrium do exist. Suppose that we
change the utilities in the game in the following way. Whenever an agreement is reached,
players receive the payoff related to this agreement in every period following the agreement
and the utility of a player is determined by the average reward criterion. The resulting
game thereby falls into the class of average reward stochastic games. Since the game also
belongs to the subclass of three-player absorbing games, it follows from Solan (1999) that
an ε-equilibrium payoff exists for every ε > 0. Since our game also belongs to the class of
perfect information stochastic games, the existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from the
results of Thuijsman and Raghavan (1997). Finally, our game is also a recursive perfect
information game with non-negative payoffs, a class for which Flesch, Kuipers, Schoen-
makers, and Vrieze (2010) demonstrate the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
for every ε > 0.
In our model, SSPE may not be unique and there might be infinitely many SSPE utili-
ties. This occurs under the conditions of Theorem A.4.3. The following result demonstrates
that such examples are degenerate in the sense that this set of games has a closure with
Lebesgue measure zero. To compute the Lebesgue measure of a set of games, we consider
a game (u, ρ) as an element of R9 × R2, where we identify ρ by its first two coordinates.
To require the zero Lebesgue measure property for the closure of a set of games, evidently
implies this property for the set of games itself, but not vice versa, as for instance illus-
trated by the set of rational numbers.
Theorem 6.2 Consider the set of games (u, ρ) ∈ G such that α1α2α3 ≤ 1. Except for
a subset of games whose closure has Lebesgue measure zero, there is a unique SSPE.
The generic uniqueness of SSPEs enables us to carry out meaningful comparative statics
exercises, the subject of the next two sections.
7 Delay and Cycles
We analyze the extent to which there can be delay in the SSPE. If the probability of delay
in a single bargaining round is δ, then the expected delay is equal to δ/(1−δ) periods. Using
the results of the Appendix, it is a straightforward exercise to compute the probability of
delay in a single bargaining round. Table 8 gives an overview of the delay probabilities.
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Theorem Example Delay probability Occurrence
A.1 [1− (1 + α2 + α1α2) min{ρ1, ρ2α1α2 ,
ρ3
α2
}, 1) Degenerate
A.3.1 2.4 ρ2 + (α1α2α3(1 + β2)− β2)(1− ρ2)
ρ1 + (α1α2α3(1 + β1)− β1)(1− ρ1)
ρ3 + (α1α2α3(1 + β3)− β3)(1− ρ3)
A.3.2 2.3 α3−(1+α2)α3ρ2
α3+ρ2
α2−(1+α1)α2ρ1
α2+ρ1
α1−(1+α3)α1ρ3
α1+ρ3
A.4.1 1− (1 + α2 + α1α2) min{ ρ1α2 , ρ2,
ρ3
α1α2
} Degenerate
A.4.2 2.2 1− 1+α2+α1α2
α2
ρ1
1− 1+α1+α1α3
α1
ρ3
1− 1+α3+α2α3
α3
ρ2
A.4.3 D1 Degenerate
D2 Degenerate
D3 Degenerate
A.4.4 2.1 0
D1 = [max{0, 1− 1+α2+α1α2ρ1α2 }, 1− 1+α2+α1α2α2+ρ1 ρ1] ∩ [max{0, 1−
1+α2+α1α2ρ1
α2
}, 1− (1 + α1 + α1α3)ρ1)
D2 = [max{0, 1− 1+α3+α2α3ρ2α3 }, 1− 1+α3+α2α3α3+ρ2 ρ2] ∩ [max{0, 1−
1+α3+α2α3ρ2
α3
}, 1− (1 + α2 + α1α2)ρ2)
D3 = [max{0, 1− 1+α1+α1α3ρ3α1 }, 1− 1+α1+α1α3α1+ρ3 ρ3] ∩ [max{0, 1−
1+α1+α1α3ρ3
α1
}, 1− (1 + α3 + α2α3)ρ3)
Table 8: Delay probabilities.
In the case of Theorem A.1 and A.4.3 the delay probability is given by an interval. This
means that for every value of delay in the interval, there is an SSPE with that probability
of delay.
An important question is whether there always exists some vector of recognition prob-
abilities ρ such that the corresponding SSPE does not involve delay.
Theorem 7.1 Let u be such that α1α2α3 ≤ 1. Then there is a ρ such that the game
(u, ρ) has an SSPE without delay.
If we think of the parameters ρi as a measure of bargaining power, then Theorem 7.1
makes clear that irrespective of the players’ utility functions, delay in bargaining can be
avoided under an appropriate distribution of bargaining power.
The intuition behind Theorem 7.1 is the following. Suppose that every player proposes
his best outcome with probability 1, meaning that outcomes are implemented according
to probability vector ρ. Under the condition α1α2α3 ≤ 1 it is always possible to choose
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ρ in such a way that every player i’s continuation payoff is less than or equal to uimi . In
particular, this means that players with high risk coefficients should have low recognition
probabilities. Given a continuation payoff below uimi , player i accepts outcome xmi with
probability 1, which in turn makes it optimal for every player to propose his best outcome
with probability 1.
The next result shows that the expected delay in bargaining goes to infinity when one
player has almost all the bargaining power. We model this by taking a sequence of recog-
nition probability vectors that converges to a unit vector and show that the limit of the
SSPE delay probability is equal to 1.
Theorem 7.2 Let u be such that α1α2α3 ≤ 1. Consider a sequence of recognition prob-
ability vectors (ρn)n∈N which converges to ei, the i-th unit vector, for some i = 1, 2, 3. For
n ∈ N, let (pn, an) be an SSPE of (u, ρn) and denote the corresponding delay probability by
δn. Then limn→∞ δn = 1.
Theorem 7.2 complements Theorem 7.1 and shows that extreme SSPE delay may occur
for certain distributions of bargaining power. To explain the result of Theorem 7.2, it
should be recalled that SSPE continuation payoffs are always less than or equal to uimi .
Assume player i has ρi close to one. When he proposes his first-best, it should be turned
down with probability close to 1, to avoid his continuation payoff reaching values above
uimi . His continuation payoff will actually be equal to u
i
mi
in an SSPE, implying that player i
proposes his best outcome with probability 1 and his middle outcome with probability 0.
On the equilibrium path it therefore holds that player i is recognized as a proposer almost
all the time, he proposes his best outcome with probability 1, which is subsequently turned
down with probability close to 1. The probability of delay is therefore close to 1 in every
bargaining round.
We also analyze whether cycles can occur. Cycles should occur according to the Con-
dorcet logic. Other authors like Chwe (1994) have argued using tools from cooperative
game theory that cycles should not occur when players are farsighted. We say that a par-
ticular play of the game has resulted in a cycle if all three alternatives have been proposed
and rejected, before some alternative is accepted. An SSPE is said to have a cycle if there
is a positive probability that the equilibrium path has resulted in a cycle. If an SSPE
has a cycle, then clearly there is also a positive probability on an equilibrium path where
consecutively alternatives 1, 2, 3, and 1 are proposed and rejected.
Theorem 7.3 The set of games (u, ρ) ∈ G admitting SSPEs with cycles has Lebesgue
measure zero.
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Cycles occur with positive probability in the SSPEs of Theorem A.1 and A.4.3. It is
easily verified that for Theorem A.1 there is always an SSPE where the equilibrium path
results in a cycle with probability arbitrarily close to one. But the conditions of these
theorems hold in degenerate cases only.
8 The Role of Risk Aversion
In this section we investigate the role of risk aversion. We concentrate on the impact of
risk aversion on the SSPE outcome probability vector (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) . Player 1 is at least as
well off with the lottery (p¯i′1, p¯i
′
2, p¯i
′
3) instead of (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) when p¯i
′
1 ≥ p¯i1 and p¯i′3 ≤ p¯i3, which
corresponds to the criterion of first-order stochastic dominance.
The standard approach to risk aversion in bargaining is to take a concave transformation
of one of the player’s utility functions. Taking such a transformation for player i will reduce
his risk coefficient, because the gap between uimi and u
i
wi
will become relatively larger than
the gap between uibi and u
i
mi
. The SSPE probability vector (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) can be rewritten
in terms of risk coefficients only and for that reason we perform the comparative statics
exercise with respect to changes in risk aversion as changes in the player’s risk coefficients.
Table 9 reports the SSPE outcome probability vectors. For Theorem A.4.3, first line,
λ ≥ 1 should be chosen to satisfy
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
< λρ1 ≤ α2 + ρ1
1 + α2 + α1α2
and
λρ1 <
1
1 + α1 + α1α3
.
For the other two lines corresponding to Theorem A.4.3, λ ≥ 1 should satisfy the appropri-
ate analogues of these inequalities. We evaluate the local effects of a change in a player’s
risk coefficient for the non-degenerate cases.
Consider the first line of Theorem A.3.1 and A.4.23 for which
(p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) = (
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
,
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
,
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
).
We have that
∂p¯i1
∂α1
< 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α1
< 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α1
> 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α2
> 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α2
< 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α2
> 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α3
= 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α3
= 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α3
= 0,
3The second and third line corresponding to Theorem A.3.1 and A.4.2 are obtained by a permutation
of the players and lead to analogous results.
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Theorem Utilities p¯i1 p¯i2 p¯i3 Occurrence
A.1 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
Degenerate
A.3.1 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
1
1+α1+α1α3
α1α3
1+α1+α1α3
α1
1+α1+α1α3
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2α3
1+α3+α2α3
α3
1+α3+α2α3
1
1+α3+α2α3
A.3.2 z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2(α3+ρ2)
1+α3+α2α3
α3+ρ2
1+α3+α2α3
1−ρ2(1+α2)
1+α3+α2α3
z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2+ρ1
1+α2+α1α2
1−ρ1(1+α1)
1+α2+α1α2
α1(α2+ρ1)
1+α2+α1α2
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
1−ρ3(1+α3)
1+α1+α1α3
α3(α1+ρ3)
1+α1+α1α3
α1+ρ3
1+α1+α1α3
A.4.1 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
Degenerate
A.4.2 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31
α2
1+α2+α1α2
1
1+α2+α1α2
α1α2
1+α2+α1α2
z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31
1
1+α1+α1α3
α1α3
1+α1+α1α3
α1
1+α1+α1α3
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 = u31
α2α3
1+α3+α2α3
α3
1+α3+α2α3
1
1+α3+α2α3
A.4.3 z¯1 = u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31 λρ1 1− λρ1 (1 + α1) α1λρ1 Degenerate
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 = u23 z¯
3 < u31 α2λρ2 λρ2 1− λρ2 (1 + α2) Degenerate
z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 = u31 1− λρ3 (1 + α3) α3λρ3 λρ3 Degenerate
A.4.4 z¯1 < u12 z¯
2 < u23 z¯
3 < u31 ρ1 ρ2 ρ3
Table 9: SSPE outcome probabilities.
and ∂p¯i1/∂αi + ∂p¯i2/∂αi + ∂p¯i3/∂αi = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
An increase in α1 yields player 1 lower probabilities for obtaining his best and middle
alternatives and an increased probability for obtaining his worst alternative. So, a less
risk averse type of player 1 is unambiguously worse off. The next question is whether
one or both other players benefit from such a change. This issue is straightforward for
player 3, who would face an increased probability for obtaining his best alternative and
lower probabilities for obtaining his middle and worst alternatives. Therefore, player 3
is unambiguously better off if player 1 becomes less risk averse. Player 2 faces lower
probabilities for both his best and worst alternatives and an increased probability for his
middle alternative. Notice however that player 2 obtains an SSPE utility of z¯2 = u23, which
is not affected by a change in the risk coefficient of player 1.
Next, an increase in α2 yields player 2 a lower probability for obtaining his best alter-
native and increased probabilities for attaining his middle and worst alternatives. A less
risk averse type of player 2 is unambiguously worse off, albeit that player 2 is affected in a
different manner than player 1 is affected by changes in α1. Since player 3 faces increased
probabilities for obtaining his best and middle alternatives and a lower probability for ob-
taining his worst alternative, player 3 is unambiguously better off if player 2 becomes less
risk averse. Player 1’s SSPE utility is not affected by player 3’s risk coefficient.
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Finally, changes in player 3’s risk coefficient have no effect on the outcome probability
vector, so both situations are unambiguously equivalent for all the players.
The crucial insight for changes in α1 and α2 is that when at an SSPE a player’s con-
tinuation value is equal to the utility of his middle alternative, this property is preserved
under small changes of the player’s utility function. When the player’s risk coefficient
increases, the only way to keep his continuation utility equal to the utility of the middle
alternative, is to improve the probability by which he obtains his best outcome and lower
the probability by which he obtains his worst outcome. It follows that an increase in a
player’s risk aversion improves his bargaining position. The effect of a change in α3 is more
subtle. Since player 1 and 2 have a continuation value equal to the utility of their middle
alternative, the ratio of the probability of receiving the best outcome and the probability
of receiving the worst outcome should not be affected by a change in α3. Since freezing
both ratios means that the outcome probability vector does not change, we find that a
change in α3 has no effects.
Our result here contrasts the finding of the bargaining literature with unanimous ap-
proval and side-payments that risk-aversion undermines a player’s bargaining position, see
e.g. Roth (1985), Safra, Zhou, and Zilcha (1990), and Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler
(1991). Harrington (1990) shows that under majority voting with side-payments, such a
result is no longer unambiguously true and higher degrees of risk aversion may be beneficial
to a player under certain circumstances. The reason there is that it is less costly to make
an offer to a more risk averse player, so a more risk averse player is more likely to be part
of a winning coalition. The total effect for a risk averse player is therefore ambiguous since
he receives lower offers, but at a higher frequency. We see here that in the context of
bargaining over a finite number of alternatives, higher degrees of risk aversion are always
beneficial.
We verify that also in the case of Theorem A.3.2 and A.4.4 higher degrees of risk aversion
improve the bargaining position. Consider the first line corresponding to Theorem A.3.2
for which
(p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) = (
α2 (α3 + ρ2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
,
α3 + ρ2
1 + α3 + α2α3
,
1− ρ2 (1 + α2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
).
We have that
∂p¯i1
∂α1
= 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α1
= 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α1
= 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α2
> 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α2
< 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α2
< 0,
∂p¯i1
∂α3
> 0, ∂p¯i2
∂α3
> 0, ∂p¯i3
∂α3
< 0,
and ∂p¯i1/∂α1 + ∂p¯i2/∂α1 + ∂p¯i3/∂α1 = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. For this derivation, observe that
∂
∂α3
α2 (α3 + ρ2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
=
α2 (1− ρ2 (1 + α2))
(1 + α3 + α2α3)
2 =
α2
1 + α3 + α2α3
p¯i3 > 0.
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First, changes in player 1’s risk coefficient have no effect. Second, in case player 2 becomes
less risk averse then this player is always worse off and player 1 is always better off. The
marginal effect of a change in α2 on the SSPE utility of player 3 is given by
∂pi1
∂α2
u31 +
∂pi2
∂α2
u32 +
∂pi3
∂α3
u33 =
(α3+ρ2)(1+α3)
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u31 − (α3+ρ2)α3(1+α3+α2α3)2u32 −
α3+ρ2
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u33
= α3+ρ2
(1+α3+α2α3)2
α3(u
3
1 − u32)− α3+ρ2(1+α3+α2α3)2 (u33 − u31) = 0.
Third, in case player 3 becomes less risk averse then this player is always worse off and
player 1 is always better off. The marginal effect of a change in α3 on the SSPE utility of
player 2 is given by
∂pi1
∂α3
u21 +
∂pi2
∂α3
u22 +
∂pi3
∂α3
u23 =
α2(1−ρ2(1+α2))
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u21 +
(1−ρ2(1+α2))
(1+α3+α2α3)2
u22 − (1−ρ2(1+α2))(1+α2)(1+α3+α2α3)2 u23
= − 1−ρ2(1+α2)
(1+α3+α2α3)2
α2(u
2
3 − u21) + 1−ρ2(1+α2)(1+α3+α2α3)2 (u22 − u23) = 0.
The second and third line corresponding to Theorem A.3.2 are obtained by a permutation
of the players and lead to analogous results.
Since z¯2 = u23, an increase in α2 is detrimental for player 2 by the same reasoning as
before. To explain the effect of an increase in α3 requires a new insight. Player 1 and 2
propose their best alternative for sure, followed by acceptance with probability 1, a feature
that is preserved following changes in α3. Player 3 randomizes as a proposer between his
best and his middle alternative, and his continuation utility conditional on being a proposer
is equal to u31, a property that is preserved under small changes in α3. An increase in α3
therefore results in a worse probability mix on outcomes for player 3 conditional on being
the proposer, and given unchanged behavior following the recognition of player 1 and 2 as
a proposer, this result in a worse ex ante probability mix on outcomes for player 3. Since
player 1 plays a pure strategy, a change in α1 has no effect.
Consider Theorem A.4.4 for which (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) = (ρ1, ρ2, ρ3). Then changes in any
player’s risk aversion have no effect on the outcome probability vector and for each player
the situation before and after such a change is unambiguously equivalent. This result is
caused by the fact that all players play a pure strategy.
In summary, we obtain for the three cases of Theorem A.3.1, A.3.2, and A.4.2 that less
risk aversion leads to a worse outcome in the sense that the probability of attaining the best
alternative decreases while the probability for obtaining the worst alternative increases. In
the remaining main case, the one of Theorem A.4.4, changes in risk attitudes have no
effect. So, combining these four cases, we find beneficial effects for risk aversion on the
own bargaining position.
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9 Concluding Remarks
We have modeled decision making by three players over a set consisting of three alternatives
as a bargaining game in extensive form with exogenous recognition probabilities. The set-
up corresponds to the well-known Condorcet paradox in the sense that the players’ utility
functions are such that naive majority voting over the alternatives results in a Condorcet
cycle. We have derived the conditions under which rational players will defy the Condorcet
logic and reach agreement in finite time with probability one whenever the geometric mean
of their risk coefficients is less than or equal to one.
The message that risk-averse players are willing to accept second-best alternatives,
thereby defying the Condorcet logic, is valid well beyond the simple case analyzed in this
paper. In a general setting with many players and many alternatives, players may accept
unfavorable alternatives, if they face the risk of ending up with an outcome that is even
worse. It also holds with great generality that the situation where an agreement is never
reached cannot be supported in an SSPE. Indeed, such a situation cannot occur whenever
there is an outcome that a majority of players prefers over not reaching an agreement, and
at least one such player has a positive recognition probability.
Many SSPEs feature delay before an agreement is reached. We show that for any
specification of the players’ risk coefficients, there are recognition probability vectors for
which no delay occurs before an agreement is reached, but also that expected delay goes
to infinity when in the limit a single player is the only proposer. To what extent such
results hold in more general settings is an open issue, but our conjecture is that under
quite general circumstances players with high bargaining power will be disciplined by the
other players by means of frequent rejections of their proposals.
We have argued that increasing risk aversion unambiguously strengthens the bargaining
position of a player. This insight is also valid in more general set-ups. If a player uses a pure
strategy in equilibrium, then small changes in risk aversion will not affect his equilibrium
behavior. Consider a player who randomizes when responding to a particular proposal. If
an increase in risk aversion affects his utility of this proposal positively, then the player’s
continuation utility has to increase to keep him indifferent between accepting and rejecting.
But then the player’s equilibrium utility increases as well, so he benefits from an increase
in risk aversion.
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Appendix A
A.1 Three Players with p¯imi > 0.
In this subsection we are analyzing SSPEs where every player makes a proposal with
probability one, proposes his middle alternative with positive probability, does not propose
his worst alternative, and may propose his best alternative with positive probability less
than one.
Consider a game (u, ρ) ∈ G and let ((p¯ibi , p¯imi , a¯imi , z¯i)i=1,2,3, p¯i) be a solution to (4.15)–
(4.22) with p¯imi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3. From (4.15), for every i, u
i
mi
≥ a¯i−1mi−1uibi + (1 − a¯i−1mi−1)z¯i,
so z¯i ≤ uimi . We argue next that for every i, z¯i = uimi . Suppose, for some i, z¯i < uimi .
Then a¯imi = 1 by (4.17), so p¯
i+1
mi+1
= 0 by (4.15), a contradiction since we are considering
the case p¯i+1mi+1 > 0. It follows that for every i, z¯
i = uimi , and by (4.15), a¯
i−1
mi−1 = 0, so the
proposal xmi by a player i is accepted with probability 1 and the proposal xbi by a player i
is rejected with probability 1. Note that since a proposal xbi by player i is rejected for sure,
player i is indifferent between making such a proposal and giving up the right to propose,
i.e. propose x0.
Equations (4.19)–(4.20) now reduce to the system
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2, (A.1)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3, (A.2)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 = u
3
1, (A.3)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1. (A.4)
Equations (4.21) and (4.22) can be simplified to
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ3p¯
3
m3
: ρ1p¯
1
m1
: ρ2p¯
2
m2
. (A.5)
Whenever utilities are such that (A.1)–(A.4) has a solution p¯i  0, an equilibrium of the
type we are looking for in this subsection exists. We derive now under what assumptions
on utilities such a solution p¯i exists. We will show that there is at most one solution, so a
solution, if it exists, is unique.
From equalities (A.1) and (A.4), we obtain
(1− p¯i2)(u12 − u13) = p¯i1(u11 − u13). (A.6)
Combining (A.2) and (A.4) leads to
p¯i1(u
2
3 − u21) = p¯i2(u22 − u23) (A.7)
= (u22 − u23)− p¯i1(u22 − u23)
u11 − u13
u12 − u13
,
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where the second equality follows using (A.6). Rewriting the last equality leads to
p¯i1 =
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
.
It is immediate that 0 < p¯i1 < 1.
By (A.7) we have p¯i2 = p¯i1/α2, and we find that
p¯i2 =
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
.
Since p¯i3 = 1− p¯i1 − p¯i2, we find that
p¯i3 =
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
.
Obviously, it holds that 0 < p¯i2 < 1 and 0 < p¯i3 < 1. At this point we have established that
there is at most one solution to (A.1)–(A.4). For there to be some solution, (A.3) should
hold. Using the already derived expressions for p¯i1, p¯i2, and p¯i3, we find that (A.3) holds if
and only if α1α2α3 = 1. This equation holds in degenerate cases only. It requires that the
product over the players of the utility difference between their best and middle alternative
be exactly equal to the product of the utility difference between the middle and the worst
alternative.
A game (u, ρ) with α1α2α3 = 1 has many equilibria (p¯, a¯) of the type described in
this subsection. All such equilibria can be constructed as follows. Let p¯i be the uniquely
determined probabilities by which the alternatives are implemented at equilibrium. Let
λ > 0 be such that, for i = 1, 2, 3, λp¯imi ≤ ρi. If player i is selected as proposer, he proposes
xmi with probability λp¯imi/ρi and xbi with probability 1 − λp¯imi/ρi. The former proposal
is accepted, the latter rejected. This construction ensures that (A.5) holds. The higher λ,
the less delay before an outcome is accepted. The highest possible choice of λ occurs when
there is at least one player i for which p¯imi = 1. In that case, the selection of player i as a
proposer leads to a proposal that is accepted for sure.
Summarizing, we have the following. Let utilities be such that α1α2α3 = 1, so there is
a unique solution p¯i  0 to (A.1)–(A.4). Then the set of SSPEs with all players making a
proposal with probability one is given by
p¯ =
 1− p¯1m1 0 p¯3m3p¯1m1 1− p¯2m2 0
0 p¯2m2 1− p¯3m3
 (A.8)
a¯1 =
 10
0
 , a¯2 =
 01
0
 , and a¯3 =
 00
1
 , (A.9)
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where p¯ satisfies (A.5). The other SSPEs are obtained by transferring part or all of the
probability 1 − p¯imi by which xbi is proposed by player i to the option not to make a
proposal, x0.
In this SSPE, each player randomizes between his security utility uimi , knowing it will
be accepted for sure by player i+ 1, and some gamble among all three alternatives in case
he either proposes his best alternative, knowing the latter will be rejected for sure, or does
not make a proposal at all. In this gamble, at some future date either player i−1 proposes
player i’s best alternative and player i accepts, or player i + 1 may propose player i’s
worst alternative but since this is player i− 1’s best alternative the latter player accepts,
or player i proposes his middle alternative, which is accepted by player i + 1. Notice that
all SSPEs are symmetric whenever the recognition probabilities (ρ1, ρ2, ρ3) are identical
to (p¯i2, p¯i3, p¯i1), because the latter ensures that the probabilities of proposing the middle
alternative are equal. In that case there is one SSPE without delay, i.e. pimi = 1 for all i.
All other SSPEs involve delay.
All SSPEs (p¯, a¯) lead to the same equilibrium payoffs z¯ given by z¯i = uimi . We have
uniqueness in equilibrium utilities but multiplicity in the supporting equilibrium strategies.
therefore, as mentioned before, the multiplicity of SSPEs is inessential. Since also v¯ii =
uimi = z¯
i, there is no advantage in being the proposer. The recognition probabilities ρ do
not influence the probability p¯ij that the bargaining process ends with outcome xj. These
probabilities depend on the utilities only.
We can summarize our findings regarding SSPE existence in the following theorem.
Theorem A.1 There is an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯imi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, if and
only if α1α2α3 = 1. In this case, there is a unique SSPE with minimal expected delay,
given by the solution (p¯, a¯) to (A.5), (A.8), and (A.9) with p¯imi = 1 for at least one player
i, where (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) is the unique solution to (A.1)–(A.4). Other SSPEs are obtained by
proportionally lowering p¯imi across players i, as well as by shifting probability weight from
p¯ibi to p¯
i
0. All SSPEs induce the same equilibrium utilities, given by z¯
i = uimi , i = 1, 2, 3.
A.2 Two Players with p¯imi > 0.
Next we consider SSPEs where one player, without loss of generality player 1, proposes
his best outcome for sure, and the other two players put positive weight on their middle
outcome. We argue that no such SSPEs exist.
Consider a game (u, ρ) ∈ G and let ((p¯ibi , p¯imi , a¯imi , z¯i)i=1,2,3, p¯i) be a solution to (4.15)–
(4.22) with p¯11 = 1, p¯
2
3 > 0, and p¯
3
1 > 0. By (4.15), a¯
1
2u
2
2 + (1 − a¯12)z¯2 ≤ u23, so z¯2 ≤ u23.
Suppose z¯2 < u23. Then a¯
2
3 = 1 by (4.17), so p¯
3
1 = 0 by (4.15), a contradiction to p¯
3
1 > 0. It
follows that z¯2 = u23. Now (4.15) implies u
2
3 ≥ a¯12u22 +(1− a¯12)u23, so a¯12 = 0. It follows that if
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player 2 proposes his best alternative, it is rejected for sure. No other player ever proposes
this alternative. The bargaining process never ends with outcome x2, i.e. p¯i2 = 0. This
is a contradiction to p¯i2 > 0. We conclude that there are no SSPEs with the properties as
stated in this subsection.
Theorem A.2 There is no SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with for some i = 1, 2, 3, p¯imi = 0,
p¯i−1mi−1 > 0, and p¯
i+1
mi+1
> 0.
A.3 One Player with p¯imi > 0.
Now we consider SSPEs with two players proposing their best outcome for sure, and where
one player, without loss of generality player 3, puts positive weight on his middle outcome.
Consider a game (u, ρ) ∈ G and let ((p¯ibi , p¯imi , a¯imi , z¯i)i=1,2,3, p¯i) be a solution to (4.15)–
(4.22) with p¯11 = 1, p¯
2
2 = 1, and p¯
3
1 > 0. So, player 1 proposes x1, player 2 proposes x2, and
player 3 mixes over x3 and x1. To obtain p¯ij > 0, j = 1, 2, 3, we must have p¯
3
3 > 0, a¯
1
2 > 0,
and a¯23 > 0. By (4.15) and (4.16) we find
a¯31u
1
1 + (1− a¯31)z¯1 ≥ u12,
a¯12u
2
2 + (1− a¯12)z¯2 ≥ u23,
a¯23u
3
3 + (1− a¯23)z¯3 = u31.
Since a¯23 > 0 and u
3
3 > u
3
1, the equality implies a¯
2
3 ∈ (0, 1) and z¯3 < u31. It follows by (4.17)
and (4.18) that z¯2 = u23. Since z¯
3 < u31, we have a¯
3
1 = 1 by (4.17), so the proposal of player 1
is accepted for sure. By a¯12 > 0 and (4.18), we also must have z¯
1 ≤ u12. There are now two
possible cases. Case 1 where z¯1 = u12 and Case 2 with z¯
1 < u12. In Case 2 we have a¯
1
2 = 1
by (4.17).
A.3.1 Case 1
It holds that (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A is an SSPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =
 1 0 1− p¯330 1 0
0 0 p¯33
 (A.10)
a¯1 =
 1a¯12
0
 , a¯2 =
 01
a¯23
 , and a¯3 =
 10
1
 , (A.11)
a¯23u
3
3 + (1− a¯23)(p¯i1u31 + p¯i2u32 + p¯i3u33) = u31, (A.12)
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p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2, (A.13)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3, (A.14)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (A.15)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, (A.16)
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33) : ρ2a¯12 : ρ3p¯33a¯23, (A.17)
where 0 < p¯33 < 1, 0 < a¯
1
2 ≤ 1, and 0 < a¯23 < 1.
Using the same derivation as in Subsection A.1, it can be shown that there is a solution
p¯i  0 to the system (A.13)–(A.16) if and only if
α1α2α3 < 1. (A.18)
Moreover, each specification of utilities satisfying (A.18) leads to a unique solution p¯i  0
to (A.13)–(A.16). Indeed, as before it holds that
p¯i1 =
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
,
p¯i2 =
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
,
p¯i3 =
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
.
Inequality (A.18) specifies that the product over the players of the utility difference between
their best and middle alternative should be less than the product of the utility difference
between the middle and worst alternative.
Rewriting (A.12), we obtain
a¯23 =
p¯i2 − α3p¯i3
α3 + p¯i2 − α3p¯i3 ,
and substitution of the expressions for p¯i2 and p¯i3 results in
a¯23 =
1− α1α2α3
1 + α3 + α2α3
. (A.19)
Notice that 0 < a¯23 < 1. By (A.17) we have
α1 =
ρ3p¯
3
3a¯
2
3
ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33)
.
Substitution of the expression for a¯23 in the latter equation, and then solving for p¯
3
3 results
in
p¯33 =
ρ1 + ρ3
ρ3
α1 + α1α3 + α1α2α3
1 + α1 + α1α3
. (A.20)
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Obviously, it holds that p¯33 > 0. Moreover, we have that p¯
3
3 < 1 if and only if
ρ1
ρ3
<
1− α1α2α3
α1 + α1α3 + α1α2α3
(<
1
α1
). (A.21)
By (A.17) we have
α2 =
ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33)
ρ2a¯12
.
We substitute the expression found for p¯33 and solve the resulting equation for a¯
1
2, and
obtain that
a¯12 =
ρ1 + ρ3
ρ2
1− α1α2α3
α2 + α1α2 + α1α2α3
. (A.22)
This expression is clearly positive. It is less than or equal to one if and only if
ρ2 ≥ 1− α1α2α3
1 + α2 + α1α2
. (A.23)
Since all players i propose their best outcome xbi with positive probability, and since a¯
3
1 = 1,
a¯12 > 0, and a¯
2
3 > 0 implies that such a proposal is accepted with positive probability, no
player wants to use the option not to make a proposal. Finally, the SSPE utilities satisfy
z¯1 = u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem A.3.1 There is an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯12 = 0, p¯23 = 0, p¯31 > 0, and
z¯1 ≥ u12 if and only if α1α2α3 < 1 and ρ is such that (A.21) and (A.23) are satisfied. In
this case, such SSPE is unique. It is given by (A.10), (A.11), (A.19), (A.20), and (A.22).
The equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 = u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
For given utilities satisfying (A.18), (A.21) requires ρ3 to be sufficiently high compared
to ρ1, and (A.23) requires ρ2 to be sufficiently high.
To summarize, players 1 and 2 propose their best alternative whenever they are the
recognized player. Player 1’s best alternative is accepted for sure, whereas player 2’s best
alternative may be rejected with positive probability. By proposing his best alternative,
this player chooses the risky option over his riskless security utility u2m2 . Player 3’s proposal
consists of randomizing between his best and middle alternative. Notice that, unlike the
SSPEs of Theorem A.1, players never use the option to refrain from making a proposal, i.e.,
pi0 = 0, i = 1, 2, 3. Since conditional equilibrium utilities satisfy v¯
i
i > z¯
i, i = 1, 2, 3, each
player enjoys an advantage whenever he is the recognized player. Moreover, conditional
on being the recognized player, player 1 achieves his best alternative, player 2 is strictly
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better off compared to his security level, and player 3 is kept at his security level. In
many bargaining models, the advantage to propose vanishes in taking the limit to the no
discounting case. Here the advantage is present under no discounting.
The SSPE leads to a positive expected delay. The reason is that player 3 is recog-
nized with positive probability and proposes x3 with positive probability. This proposal
is rejected by both players with positive probability. Player 1 always proposes x1, which
is accepted by player 3. Player 2 always proposes x2, which is accepted by player 1 with
positive probability a¯12 and is rejected by both players otherwise.
Using a straightforward relabeling of the players, we find fully symmetric results for
SSPEs with p¯22 = p¯
3
3 = 1 and player 1 mixing between x1 and x2, and SSPEs with p¯
1
1 =
p¯33 = 1 and player 2 mixing between x2 and x3.
A.3.2 Case 2
It holds that (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A is an SSPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =
 1 0 1− p¯330 1 0
0 0 p¯33
 (A.24)
a¯1 =
 11
0
 , a¯2 =
 01
a¯23
 , and a¯3 =
 10
1
 , (A.25)
a¯23u
3
3 + (1− a¯23)
(
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3
)
= u31, (A.26)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 < u
1
2, (A.27)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3, (A.28)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (A.29)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, (A.30)
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 + ρ3(1− p¯33) : ρ2 : ρ3p¯33a¯23, (A.31)
where 0 < p¯33 < 1 and 0 < a¯
2
3 < 1.
We can rewrite (A.26)–(A.29) as
α3 − (1− a¯23)(p¯i1 + p¯i2(1 + α3)) = 0, (A.32)
p¯i1α1 − p¯i3 < 0, (A.33)
−p¯i1 + p¯i2α2 = 0, (A.34)
−p¯i2 + p¯i3α3 < 0. (A.35)
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We have a system (A.30), (A.31), (A.32), (A.34) with five equations in the five unknowns
p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3, p¯
3
3, and a¯
2
3. Solving this system results in outcome probabilities
p¯i1 =
α2(α3 + ρ2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
, p¯i2 =
α3 + ρ2
1 + α3 + α2α3
, and p¯i3 =
1− ρ2(1 + α2)
1 + α3 + α2α3
,
and SSPE action probabilities
p¯33 =
ρ1 − α2ρ2 + ρ3
ρ3
, (A.36)
a¯23 =
ρ2
α3 + ρ2
. (A.37)
It is immediate that the solution satisfies 0 < a¯23 < 1.
The inequality (A.33) is equivalent to
ρ2 <
1− α1α2α3
1 + α2 + α1α2
(<
1
1 + α2
). (A.38)
The inequality (A.35) is always satisfied.
The requirement p¯33 > 0 is equivalent to ρ2 < 1/(1 + α2), which implies p¯i3 > 0. This
requirement follows from (A.38). The requirement p¯33 < 1 is equivalent to
ρ1
ρ2
< α2. (A.39)
Since all players i propose their best outcome xbi with positive probability, and since a¯
3
1 = 1,
a¯12 = 1, and a¯
2
3 > 0 implies that such a proposal is accepted with positive probability, no
player wants to use the option not to make a proposal. We summarize our findings in the
following theorem.
Theorem A.3.2 There is an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯12 = 0, p¯23 = 0, p¯31 > 0, and
z¯1 < u12 if and only if α1α2α3 < 1 and ρ is such that (A.38) and (A.39) are satisfied. In this
case, an SSPE is unique. It is given by (A.24), (A.25), (A.36), and (A.37). Equilibrium
utilities satisfy z¯1 < u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
For given utilities satisfying (A.18), (A.38) requires ρ2 to be sufficiently low. It com-
plements (A.23) which implies that SSPEs as in Case 1 cannot coexist with those as in
Case 2. Inequality (A.39) requires ρ1 to be sufficiently low compared to ρ2. Notice that,
like the SSPE of Theorem A.3.1, the option not to make a proposal cannot be chosen with
any positive probability.
The SSPE leads to a positive expected delay. The reason is that player 3 is recognized
with positive probability, proposes x3 with positive probability, which is rejected by both
players with positive probability. The proposals of players 1 and 2 are accepted for sure.
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Similar to the previous case, all three players have an advantage to propose. Conditional
on being the recognized player, player 3 cannot do better than getting the utility of his
middle alternative. Conditional on being the proposer, both player 1 and player 2 achieve
the utility of the best alternative.
By a relabeling of the players, we find fully symmetric results for SSPEs with p¯22 =
p¯33 = 1 and player 1 mixing between x1 and x2, and SSPEs with p¯
1
1 = p¯
3
3 = 1 and player 2
mixing between x2 and x3.
A.4 No Player with p¯imi > 0.
We finally consider SSPEs where all players propose their best outcome for sure. Let
(p¯ibi , p¯
i
mi
, a¯imi , z¯
i) be a solution to (4.15)–(4.22) with p¯11 = p¯
2
2 = p¯
3
3 = 1. To obtain p¯ij > 0,
j = 1, 2, 3, we must have a¯31 > 0, a¯
1
2 > 0, and a¯
2
3 > 0. If follows from (4.18) that z¯
1 ≤ u12,
z¯2 ≤ u23, and z¯3 ≤ u31. Since all players propose their best outcome with positive probability,
and since such a proposal is accepted with positive probability, no player wants to use the
option not to make a proposal. We distinguish four possible cases of interest. In Case 1,
there are three players with z¯i = uimi , in Case 2 there are two such players, without loss
of generality, players 1 and 2, in Case 3 there is one such player, without loss of generality
player 1, and in Case 4 all players have z¯i < uimi .
A.4.1 Case 1
It holds that (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A is an SSPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 (A.40)
a¯1 =
 1a¯12
0
 , a¯2 =
 01
a¯23
 , and a¯3 =
 a¯310
1
 , (A.41)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2,
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3,
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 = u
3
1,
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1a¯
3
1 : ρ2a¯
1
2 : ρ3a¯
2
3. (A.42)
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As in Section A.1 we obtain that
α1α2α3 = 1, (A.43)
p¯i1 =
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
, (A.44)
p¯i2 =
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
, (A.45)
p¯i3 =
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
. (A.46)
The SSPE is not unique. Let λ > 0 be such that, for i = 1, 2, 3, λp¯imi ≤ ρmi . If player i
has to respond to the proposal xmi , he accepts with probability a¯
i
mi
= λp¯imi/ρmi > 0 and
rejects with probability 1 − λp¯imi/ρmi < 1. This construction ensures that (A.42) holds.
The higher λ, the less delay before an outcome is accepted. The highest possible choice
of λ occurs when there is at least one player i for which a¯imi = 1. In that case, selection
of player i + 1 as proposer leads to a proposal that is accepted for sure. Note that λ = 0
would violate p¯imi > 0. The set of SSPEs is not closed. The no discounting case differs in
this respect from the discounting case where the set of SSPEs is compact.
By definition of this case, the equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯i = uimi , i = 1, 2, 3. Since
also a¯imi > 0 and z¯
i = uimi , the conditional equilibrium utilities satisfy v¯
i
i ∈ (uimi , uibi),
i = 1, 2, 3. We conclude that there is an advantage in becoming the recognized player and
that a recognized player does strictly better than his security level uimi .
Theorem A.4.1 There is an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, and
z¯i ≥ uimi , i = 1, 2, 3, if and only if α1α2α3 = 1. In this case, there is a unique SSPE
with minimal delay. It is given by the solution (p¯, a¯) to (A.40), (A.41), and (A.42) with
a¯imi = 1 for at least one player i, where (p¯i1, p¯i2, p¯i3) is defined in (A.44)–(A.46). Other
SSPEs are obtained by proportionally lowering a¯imi across players i. All SSPEs induce the
same equilibrium utilities, given by z¯i = uimi , i = 1, 2, 3.
A.4.2 Case 2
It holds that (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A is an SSPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 (A.47)
a¯1 =
 1a¯12
0
 , a¯2 =
 01
a¯23
 , and a¯3 =
 10
1
 , (A.48)
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a¯23u
3
3 + (1− a¯23)(p¯i1u31 + p¯i2u32 + p¯i3u33) ≥ u31, (A.49)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2,
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 = u
2
3,
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1,
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 : ρ2a¯
1
2 : ρ3a¯
2
3. (A.50)
As in Subsection 9 we obtain that
α1α2α3 < 1, (A.51)
p¯i1 =
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
, p¯i2 =
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
, and p¯i3 =
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
.
From (A.50) it then follows that
a¯12 =
ρ1
α2ρ2
, (A.52)
a¯23 =
α1ρ1
ρ3
. (A.53)
To satisfy (A.49) we need that
ρ1
ρ3
≥ 1− α1α2α3
α1 + α1α3 + α1α2α3
(≤ 1
α1
). (A.54)
The requirements a¯12 ≤ 1 and a¯23 ≤ 1 lead to
ρ1
ρ2
≤ α2, (A.55)
ρ3
ρ1
≥ α1. (A.56)
By definition of the case, the equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 = u1m1 , z¯
2 = u2m2 , and z¯
3 < u3m3 .
For i = 1, 2, a¯i−1bi > 0 and z¯
i = uimi imply that the conditional equilibrium utilities satisfy
v¯ii > u
i
mi
. Since z¯3 < u3m3 , it follows that player 3 has an advantage to propose.
We can summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem A.4.2 There is an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 ≥ u12,
z¯2 ≥ u23, and z¯3 < u31 if and only if α1α2α3 < 1 and ρ is such that (A.54), (A.55), and
(A.56) are satisfied. In this case, there is a unique SSPE. It is given by (A.47), (A.48),
(A.52), and (A.53). The equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 = u12, z¯
2 = u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
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For given utilities satisfying (A.51), (A.54) requires ρ1 to be sufficiently high compared
to ρ3, and (A.56) requires ρ1 to be sufficiently low. Moreover, ρ1 should be sufficiently low
compared to ρ2 by (A.55). Notice that, unlike the SSPE of Theorem A.1, the option not
to make a proposal cannot be chosen with any positive probability.
By (A.50), the SSPE does not involve delay if and only if ρi is equal to p¯ii for ALL
i = 1, 2, 3.
By a relabeling of the players, we obtain fully symmetric results for SSPEs with p¯imi = 0,
i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 ≥ u12, z¯2 < u23, and z¯3 ≥ u31, and for SSPEs with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 < u12,
z¯2 ≥ u23, and z¯3 ≥ u31.
A.4.3 Case 3
It holds that (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A is an SSPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 (A.57)
a¯1 =
 1a¯12
0
 , a¯2 =
 01
1
 , and a¯3 =
 10
1
 , (A.58)
a¯12u
2
2 + (1− a¯12)(p¯i1u21 + p¯i2u22 + p¯i3u23) ≥ u23, (A.59)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 = u
1
2, (A.60)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 < u
2
3, (A.61)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (A.62)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 : ρ2a¯
1
2 : ρ3. (A.63)
Rewriting (A.60) and using (A.63), we find that
ρ3 = α1ρ1. (A.64)
It follows that Case 3 admits SSPEs in degenerate cases only, more precisely, when (A.64)
holds. In these degenerate cases, there is a continuum of SSPEs, inducing a continuum of
SSPE utilities for players 2 and 3. We parametrize the SSPEs by means of the positive
real number λ and using (A.63) we write
p¯i1 = λρ1 and p¯i3 = α1λρ1.
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Suppose by means of contradiction that λ < 1. Using (A.63), we find that
p¯i1 = λρ1 < ρ1, p¯i2 =
p¯i1ρ2a¯
1
2
ρ1
= λρ2a¯
1
2 < ρ2, and p¯i3 =
p¯i1ρ3
ρ1
= λρ3 < ρ3.
We obtain the contradiction 1 = p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 < ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 = 1. Consequently, we have
shown that λ ≥ 1.
Since ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 = 1 and p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1, we have
ρ2 = 1− (1 + α1)ρ1, and p¯i2 = 1− (1 + α1)λρ1.
Using (A.63), we have
a¯12 =
1− (1 + α1)λρ1
λ− (1 + α1)λρ1 . (A.65)
The denominator of (A.65) is positive if and only if ρ1 < 1/(1 + α1). The inequalities in
(A.61) and (A.59) are satisfied if and only if
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
< λρ1 ≤ α2 + ρ1
1 + α2 + α1α2
(<
1
1 + α1
). (A.66)
The inequality in (A.66) in parentheses implies that a¯12 and p¯i2 are positive.
The inequality (A.62) is satisfied if and only if
λρ1 <
1
1 + α1 + α1α3
. (A.67)
The first inequality of (A.66) together with (A.67) imply that α1α2α3 < 1. There is some
λ ≥ 1 such that (A.66) and (A.67) are satisfied if and only if α1α2α3 < 1 and
ρ1 <
1
1 + α1 + α1α3
. (A.68)
The lowest possible value of λ ≥ 1 such that (A.66) and (A.67) are satisfied is given by
max{1, 1
ρ1
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
}. (A.69)
We can summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem A.4.3 There is an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 ≥ u12,
z¯2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31 if and only if α1α2α3 < 1, ρ3 = α1ρ1, and ρ1 satisfies (A.68). In this
case there is a continuum of SSPEs. Any λ ≥ 1 satisfying (A.66) and (A.67) induces an
SSPE given by (A.57), (A.58), and (A.65). Equilibrium utilities depend on λ and satisfy
z¯1 = u12, z¯
2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
40
Notice that, unlike the SSPE of Theorem A.1, the option not to make a proposal cannot
be chosen with any positive probability. The SSPE does not involve delay if and only if
λ = 1. Whenever ρ1 <
α2
1+α2+α1α2
, the lowest possible choice for λ strictly exceeds 1, and
delay cannot be avoided.
Fully symmetric results hold for SSPEs with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯
1 < u12, z¯
2 ≥ u23, and
z¯3 < u31, and for SSPEs with p¯
i
mi
= 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 < u12, z¯
2 < u23, and z¯
3 ≥ u31.
A.4.4 Case 4
It holds that (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A is an SSPE if and only if there is p¯i such that
p¯ =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 (A.70)
a¯1 =
 11
0
 , a¯2 =
 01
1
 , and a¯3 =
 10
1
 , (A.71)
p¯i1u
1
1 + p¯i2u
1
2 + p¯i3u
1
3 < u
1
2, (A.72)
p¯i1u
2
1 + p¯i2u
2
2 + p¯i3u
2
3 < u
2
3, (A.73)
p¯i1u
3
1 + p¯i2u
3
2 + p¯i3u
3
3 < u
3
1, (A.74)
p¯i1 + p¯i2 + p¯i3 = 1,
p¯i1 : p¯i2 : p¯i3 = ρ1 : ρ2 : ρ3. (A.75)
The equalities in (A.75) immediately lead to the conclusion that p¯i1 = ρ1, p¯i2 = ρ2, and
p¯i3 = ρ3. The inequalities in (A.72)–(A.74) are equivalent to the following conditions:
ρ3
ρ1
> α1, (A.76)
ρ1
ρ2
> α2, (A.77)
ρ2
ρ3
> α3. (A.78)
It is immediate to verify that (A.76)–(A.78) imply that α1α2α3 < 1.
By definition of the case, the equilibrium utilities satisfy z¯1 < u1m1 , z¯
2 < u2m2 and z¯
3 <
u3m3 . Since each player accepts his middle alternative for sure, the conditional equilibrium
utilities satisfy v¯11 = u
1
1, v¯
2
2 = u
2
2 and v¯
3
3 = u
3
3. Therefore, each player has an advantage to
propose and, as the recognized player, each player can realize his best alternative for sure.
We can summarize our findings in the following theorem.
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Theorem A.4.4 There is an SSPE (p¯, a¯) ∈ P × A with p¯imi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, z¯1 < u12,
z¯2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31 if and only if α1α2α3 < 1 and ρ is such that (A.76)–(A.78) are satis-
fied. In this case there is a unique SSPE. It is given by (A.70) and (A.71). The equilibrium
utilities satisfy z¯1 < u12, z¯
2 < u23, and z¯
3 < u31.
Notice that, unlike the SSPE of Theorem A.1, the option not to make a proposal
cannot be chosen with any positive probability. The SSPE is in pure strategies in which
each player always proposes his best alternative and always accepts his best and middle
alternative. These strategies imply immediate agreement and the probability distribution
over the three alternatives coincides with the recognition probabilities, i.e. p¯ii = ρi. The
SSPE utilities are below the utility of the middle alternative, which makes accepting the
middle alternative the unique best response. The recognized player takes full advantage of
this response by proposing his best alternative knowing it will be accepted for sure.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 4.2:
⇒ After observing that ∑3j=0 phj rh−1jh rh+1jh < 1 for some player h, i.e. player h makes with
positive probability a proposal that is accepted with positive probability is equivalent to
pi0 = 0, this direction follows from the derivations in this section.
⇐ We first argue that a solution (p, r, v, z) to (4.1)–(4.7) corresponds to a strategy profile
(p, r) inducing utilities (v, z) and satisfying the one–shot deviation property. To show that
(v, z) are the utilities induced by (p, r) we have to show that given the strategy profile (p, r)
the system (4.1)–(4.2) has a unique solution. We substitute the expression for vih given in
(4.1) in (4.2) and obtain a system of three equations and three unknowns of the form
zi = ci + dzi, i = 1, 2, 3.
The constant d is given by
d =
3∑
h=1
ρh
3∑
j=0
phj r
h−1
jh r
h+1
jh < 1,
where the inequality follows from the fact that ρh is positive for all h. Since d < 1, the
uniqueness of z follows immediately, leading to the uniqueness of v. Now it follows from
(4.1)–(4.7) that (p, r) has the one–shot deviation property.
We argue next that the absence of a profitable one-shot deviation implies the absence
of a profitable deviation, proving that (p, r) is an SSPE. The usual proofs do not apply
because future payoffs are not discounted. Nevertheless, the property that for some h it
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holds that
∑3
j=0 p
h
j r
h−1
jh r
h+1
jh < 1 coupled with the observation that ρh > 0 implies that
every round there is a positive probability that negotiations terminate. Suppose there is
some player, say i, who has a profitable deviation from (p, r) at some decision node. The
feature that every round there is a positive probability that negotiations terminate implies
that player i also has a profitable deviation from (p, r) that coincides with the strategy
prescribed by (pi, ri) except for a finite number of decision nodes, exactly as in the case
with discounting. Finally, the usual backwards induction argument shows that player i
must then also have a profitable one–shot deviation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: We show first that each player i has zi strictly exceeding
the utility uiwi of his worst outcome. Suppose, on the contrary, that player i has z
i = uiwi .
The probability is therefore 1 that the outcome xwi is accepted at some point in time,
since otherwise the utility of i strictly exceeds uiwi . Therefore, it follows that z
i−1 = ui−1bi−1
and zi+1 = ui+1mi+1 . Since u
i−1
mi
= ui−1wi−1 < u
i−1
bi−1 = z
i−1, (4.7) yields that player i − 1 rejects
proposal xmi by player i with probability 1, so r
i−1
mii
= 1. Since ri−1mii = 1 and z
i+1 = ui+1mi+1 <
ui+1bi+1 = u
i+1
mi
, (4.4) yields that player i+1 rejects proposal xmi by player i with probability 0.
Proposal xmi by player i is therefore accepted with probability 1, so v
i
i ≥ uimi > uiwi . Since
vii−1 ≥ uiwi and vii+1 ≥ uiwi , we find that uiwi = zi = ρ1vi1+ρ2vi2+ρ3vi3 > uiwi , a contradiction.
We conclude that each player has zi strictly exceeding uiwi , i.e.
zi > uiwi , i = 1, 2, 3. (4.12)
We show next that each player i has zi strictly lower than the utility of his best outcome,
uibi . If some player i has z
i = uibi , then outcome xbi is accepted with probability 1, so
zi+1 = ui+1bi = u
i+1
wi+1
, a contradiction to (4.12). We have found that
zi < uibi , i = 1, 2, 3. (4.13)
Next, we argue that any voter rejects his worst alternative for sure. To see this, when
player h proposes outcome xwi , i 6= h, then player i is the last one to vote. It holds by
(4.12) that zi > uiwi , so by (4.7), r
i
wih
= 1. We have shown that
riwih = 1, i = 1, 2, 3, h 6= i. (4.9)
We continue by establishing that, independent of who proposes, the recognized player
can always conclude the bargaining for sure by proposing either his worst or his middle
alternative. Consider a proposal xmi by player i, so player i proposes his middle outcome
and player i+ 1, for whom this is the best alternative, votes before player i− 1. We argue
that this proposal will be accepted with probability 1 by player i + 1, i.e. ri+1mii = 0. By
43
(4.9), since mi = wi−1, ri−1mii = 1. Using that mi = bi+1, we know by (4.13), u
i+1
mi
> zi+1.
Since ri−1mii = 1, we use (4.4) to conclude that r
i+1
mii
= 0. We have derived that
r221 = r
3
32 = r
1
13 = 0. (4.10)
Consider now a proposal xwi by player i meaning player i proposes his worst outcome. We
argue that this proposal will be accepted with probability one, i.e. ri−1wii r
i+1
wii
= 0. Since
wi = bi−1, it follows from (4.13) that ui−1wi > z
i−1, so by (4.4), ri−1wii = 0 or r
i+1
wii
= 0. We
have derived that
r231r
3
31 = r
1
12r
3
12 = r
1
23r
2
23 = 0. (4.11)
As a corollary, a recognized player will never propose his worst alternative, because he can
do strictly better by proposing his middle alternative, i.e.
piwi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3. (4.8)
We have already argued that each zi is a weighted average of uij, j = 1, 2, 3, with
weights pij independent of i. We argue next that all these weights are positive. If only one
weight would be positive, we would get a contradiction to (4.12) for some i. Suppose that
exactly two weights are positive, without loss of generality the weights pi1 on outcome x1
and pi2 on x2 sum up to one and pi3 = 0, so z
i = pi1u
i
1 + pi2u
i
2. For the equality pi3 = 0 to
hold, the proposal x3 by player 3 should be rejected with probability 1. The proposal x1
by player 3 is accepted with probability 1 according to (4.10). We can now use (4.3) to
conclude that p30 = p
3
3 = 0, and since p
3
2 = 0 by (4.8), we know that p
3
1 = 1. From (4.4) and
(4.9), the proposal x1 by player 1 is accepted with probability 1 by player 3. The proposal
x2 by player 1 is accepted with probability 1 according to (4.10). We can now use (4.3) to
conclude that p10 = p
1
2 = 0, and since p
1
3 = 0 by (4.8), we know that p
1
1 = 1. A proposal x2
by player 2 would be rejected with probability 1 by player 1 using (4.5) and the fact that
r322 = 0 by (4.9). It now follows that pi1 = 1, a contradiction to (4.12). We conclude that
all weights are positive,
pi1, pi2, pi3 > 0. (4.14)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.4: Assume that (p, r) ∈ P ×R satisfies (4.1)–(4.7). We show
that (p, r¯) satisfies (4.1)–(4.7), where r¯ is as defined in Theorem 4.4. We verify first that
r¯ is proposer independent. Indeed, for i = 1, 2, 3, we have the following. It holds by
definition that r¯i0h = 1, h 6= i. We have by definition that r¯ibii+1 = 0 and r¯ibii−1 = ribii−1 = 0,
where the last equality holds by (4.10). Also it holds by definition that r¯imii+1 = r
i
mii+1
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and r¯imii−1 = r
i
mii+1
, so r¯imii+1 = r¯
i
mii−1. Finally, we have r
i
wih
= 1, h 6= i, by (4.9), and
r¯iwih = r
i
wih
, h 6= i, by definition.
We show next that
rh−1jh r
h+1
jh = r¯
h−1
jh r¯
h+1
jh , h = 1, 2, 3, j = 0, 1, 2, 3. (B.1)
For j = 0, this follows immediately from the definition of R. Three possible cases remain:
(i) j = bh, (ii) j = mh, and (iii) j = wh.
Case (i), j = bh. Since bh = mh−1 = wh+1, we have
r¯h−1bhh r¯
h+1
bhh
= r¯h−1mh−1hr¯
h+1
wh+1h
= rh−1mh−1hr
h+1
wh+1h
= rh−1bhh r
h+1
bhh
,
where the second equality follows by definition of r¯.
Case (ii), j = mh. Since mh = wh−1 = bh+1, we obtain
r¯h−1mhhr¯
h+1
mhh
= r¯h−1wh−1hr¯
h+1
bh+1h
= rh−1wh−1hr
h+1
bh+1h
= rh−1mhhr
h+1
mhh
,
where the second equality follows by definition of r¯.
Case (iii), j = wh. By (4.11), it holds that r
h−1
whh
rh+1whh = 0. Since wh = bh−1, we have
that r¯h−1whh = r¯
h−1
bh−1h = 0, where the last equality follows by definition of r¯. It follows that
r¯h−1whhr¯
h+1
whh
= 0.
Using (B.1) we have that (p, r¯, v, z) satisfies (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3). We verify next that
(p, r¯, v, z) satisfies (4.4)–(4.7). Consider some r¯ijh. If j = bi, then r¯
i
jh = 0 and i = fjh, so
(4.4), (4.6), and (4.7) hold trivially. Implication (4.5) holds as well, since zi < uibi by (4.13).
If j = wi, then r¯
i
jh = r
i
jh = 1 by (4.9), so (4.5) and (4.7) hold trivially. Since by (4.12)
zi > uiwi , we find that (4.4) and (4.6) also hold. If j = mi and h = i + 1, then i = fjh, so
(4.6) and (4.7) hold trivially. We have that r¯ijh = r
i
jh and r¯
i′
jh = r¯
i−1
wi−1i+1 = r
i−1
wi−1i+1 = r
i′
jh,
so (4.4) and (4.5) hold. Finally, we consider the case where j = mi and h = i−1, so i = sjh
and (4.4) and (4.5) hold trivially. Assume r¯ijh > 0. Since by definition r¯
i
jh = r¯
i
mii−1 = r
i
mii+1
,
we have rimii+1 > 0, so by (4.4) z
i ≥ uimi or ri−1mii+1 = 0. Since mi = wi−1, (4.9) implies
ri−1mii+1 = 1, so z
i ≥ uimi . It follows that (4.6) holds. Assume r¯ijh < 1. Since by definition
r¯ijh = r¯
i
mii−1 = r
i
mii+1
, we have rimii+1 < 1, so by (4.5) z
i ≤ uimi or ri−1mii+1 = 0. Since
mi = wi−1, (4.9) implies ri−1mii+1 = 1, so z
i ≥ uimi . It follows that (4.7) holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.5:
(⇒) This direction follows immediately from the results derived in this section.
(⇐) This direction follows from Theorem 4.2 by defining, for h = 1, 2, 3, i = 1, 2, 3, and
j = 0, 1, 2, 3,
v¯ih = p¯
h
mh
uimh + p¯
h
bh
a¯h−1bh u
i
bh
+ p¯hbh(1− a¯h−1bh )z¯i,
r¯ijh = 1− a¯ij,
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and verifying that a solution (p¯, a¯, p¯i, z¯) to (4.15)–(4.22) inducing expected utilities v¯ and
rejection probabilities r¯ leads to a solution (p¯, r¯, v¯, z¯) to (4.1)–(4.7) with p¯i = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: Necessity follows by Table 7. We now turn to sufficiency
of the condition. By Theorem A.1 an SSPE exists if α1α2α3 = 1. It remains to be shown
that an SSPE exists if α1α2α3 < 1.
By Theorem A.4.4 an SSPE exists if ρ1/ρ2 > α2, ρ2/ρ3 > α3, and ρ3/ρ1 > α1. Consider
now the cases where the conditions of Theorem A.4.4 are not satisfied. We claim that then
(
ρ3
ρ1
≥ α1 and ρ1
ρ2
≤ α2) or (ρ1
ρ2
≥ α2 and ρ2
ρ3
≤ α3) or (ρ2
ρ3
≥ α3 and ρ3
ρ1
≤ α1). (B.2)
Indeed, assume, without loss of generality, ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2. Either it holds that ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1 or
ρ3/ρ1 < α1. In the former case the first formula in (B.2) is true, in the latter case it should
hold that ρ2/ρ3 ≥ α3, since otherwise
1 =
ρ1
ρ2
ρ2
ρ3
ρ3
ρ1
< α2α3α1 < 1,
and the third formula in (B.2) is true.
We show next that an SSPE exists whenever ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1 and ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2. The other
two cases in (B.2) follow by symmetry. If ρ3/ρ1 = α1 and ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2, then line 1 in
Theorem A.4.3 implies the existence of an SSPE since ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2 implies ρ1 < 1/(1 +α1 +
α1α3). Suppose, by contradiction, that ρ1 ≥ 1/(1 + α1 + α1α3). Then
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 ≥ 1
1 + α1 + α1α3
+
1
α2 + α1α2 + α1α2α3
+
α1
1 + α1 + α1α3
=
1 + α2 + α1α2
α2 + α1α2 + α1α2α3
> 1,
a contradiction. If ρ1/ρ2 = α2 and ρ3/ρ1 > α1, then line 2 in Theorem A.4.3 implies
the existence of an SSPE since ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1 implies ρ2 < 1/(1 + α2 + α1α2). Suppose, by
contradiction, that ρ2 ≥ 1/(1 + α2 + α1α2). Then
1 = ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 >
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
+
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
+
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
= 1,
a contradiction.
It remains to be shown that an SSPE exists if ρ3/ρ1 > α1 and ρ1/ρ2 < α2. By line 1 in
Theorem A.4.2, an SSPE exists if ρ3/ρ1 ≥ α1, ρ1/ρ2 ≤ α2, and ρ1/ρ3 ≥ β1, and by line 1
in Theorem A.3.1 an SSPE exists if ρ1/ρ3 < β1 and ρ2 ≥ α3β3.
It remains to be shown that an SSPE exists if ρ3/ρ1 > α1, ρ1/ρ2 < α2, ρ1/ρ3 < β1, and
ρ2 < α3β3. This follows from line 1 in Theorem A.3.2. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 6.2: Existence follows from Theorem 6.1. Leave out the games
satisfying the conditions of Theorem A.1, Theorem A.4.1, and Theorem A.4.3. This cor-
responds to a set of games whose closure has Lebesgue measure zero. Comparing the
conditions in any two distinct rows (that do not correspond to Theorem A.3.1) of Table 7
leads to the conclusion that the corresponding two sets of parameters have an empty inter-
section. This conclusion follows directly in most cases. In some cases one has to make use of
the property that αiβi < 1, which implies that we cannot have simultaneously ρj/ρk < αi
and ρk/ρj < βi. Finally, each of the Theorem A.3.1, A.3.2, A.4.1, and A.4.4 identify a
unique SSPE. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7.1: First we consider the case where α1α2α3 = 1. From Table 8
and Theorem A.1 it follows that we can choose
ρ1 =
1
1 + α2 + α1α2
, ρ2 =
α1α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
, and ρ3 =
α2
1 + α2 + α1α2
,
which leads to a delay probability of 1-1=0.
Next we consider the case where α1α2α3 < 1. We show that ρ can be chosen such that
the conditions of Theorem A.4.4 as listed in Table 7 are satisfied, which demonstrates the
absence of delay. We define γ = 1/ 3
√
α1α2α3 > 1 and
ρ1 =
γ2α2α3
1 + γα3 + γ2α2α3
, ρ2 =
γα3
1 + γα3 + γ2α2α3
, and ρ3 =
1
1 + γα3 + γ2α2α3
.
It therefore holds that
ρ1
ρ2
= γα2 > α2,
ρ2
ρ3
= γα3 > α3, and
ρ3
ρ1
=
1
γ2α2α3
= γα1 > α1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7.2: Without loss of generality, we may assume that for all
n ∈ N, (u, ρn) satisfies the conditions of exactly one of the theorems, i.e. one of the 15
subcases displayed in Table 8.
According to Table 8, the lower bound on the delay probability following from an SSPE
of Theorem A.1 is given by
1− (1 + α2 + α1α2) min{ρn1 ,
ρn2
α1α2
,
ρn3
α2
}.
Clearly, this lower bound converges to 1 when n→∞.
According to Table 7, the first line of conditions in Theorem A.3.1 states that ρn2 ≥ α3β3,
so limn→∞ ρn2 = 1. Then Table 8, first line corresponding to A.3.1, yields that limn→∞ δn =
1. The other cases corresponding to Theorem A.3.1 follow by symmetry.
47
According to Table 7, the first line of conditions in Theorem A.3.2 states that ρn2 <
α3β3, so it is impossible that limn→∞ ρn2 = 1, so limn→∞ ρ
n
2 = 0. Then Table 8, first
line corresponding to A.3.2, yields that limn→∞ δn = 1. The other cases corresponding to
Theorem A.3.2 follow by symmetry.
It is evident from Table 8 that the delay probability following from Theorem A.4.1 goes
to 1 when n goes to infinity.
According to Table 7, the first line of conditions in Theorem A.4.2 states that ρn1 ≤ α2ρn2 ,
so limn→∞ ρn1 = 0. Then Table 8, first line corresponding to A.4.2, yields that limn→∞ δn =
1. The other cases corresponding to Theorem A.4.2 follow by symmetry.
According to Table 7, the first line of conditions in Theorem A.4.3 states that ρn1 <
1/(1+α1 +α1α3), so limn→∞ ρn1 = 0. Then Table 8, first line corresponding to A.4.3, yields
that the lower bound on the delay probability following from an SSPE converges to 1. The
other cases corresponding to Theorem A.4.3 follow by symmetry.
Table 7 demonstrates that (u, ρn)n∈N cannot satisfy the conditions of Theorem A.4.4.
Suppose without loss of generality that limn→∞ ρn1 = 0. Since ρ
n
2 < ρ
n
1/α2, we have
limn→∞ ρn2 = 0. Since ρ
n
3 < ρ
n
2/α3, we have limn→∞ ρ
n
3 = 0. It follows that ρ converges
to the zero vector, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7.3: It is easily verified that, with the exception of Theorem A.1
and A.4.3, there is always an alternative that, in an SSPE, is never rejected when being
proposed. The Conditions in Theorem A.1 and A.4.3 are only satisfied for sets of games
having a closure with Lebesgue measure zero. Q.E.D.
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